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On the Principle of Legal Certainty in the Louisiana
Civil Law Tradition: From the Manifesto to the Great
Repealing Act and Beyond
John A. Lovett*
It will surprise no one to suggest that the promotion of legal
certainty has always been one of the most important purported goals
of the civil law tradition in Louisiana. What exactly, however, is this
perennially important legal principle? When judges, lawyers, law
professors, and others interested in the law refer to the value of legal
certainty, or to the dangers of uncertainty in the law, they are often
first thinking, on a functional level, of the perceived advantages of
clearly defined legal rules that enable people to "know the nature of
their rights and obligations and be able to plan their actions with
some confidence about the legal consequences."' This practical need
for predictability in legal results is often regarded as particularly
important in areas of the law where stability is highly valued, like
property law and the law related to land titles.2 Thinking a little more
abstractly about this same phenomenon, Professor Carol Rose
explains that this drive for predictability is particularly strong in areas
of law that define legal relationships with strangers, those with whom
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1. John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 48 (2d ed. 1985) (defining
certainty as he believes it is commonly understood in the common law world). See
also Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La. L.
Rev. 727, 748 (1962) [hereinafter Tate, Techniques] (asserting that "an underlying
fundamental purpose of any legal system" is the establishment of "a certainty of
legal rule, and a predictability of outcome in its application in the event of
litigation, upon which men regulated by that system of laws can rely in their
everyday dealings").
2. Tate, Techniques, supra note 1, at 748 ("it is usually pointed out that the
stability of land titles requires inflexible and unchanging rules and firm adherence
to precedent, because many property rights are required in reliance thereupon");
Clarence J. Morrow, An Approach to the Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 10
La. L. Rev. 59, 70 (1949) (discussing appropriateness of providing "relatively
narrow, precise rules for those fields" which demand a "maximum of
predictability," for instance, "inheritance, property and prescription"); Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 577 (1988) (the
commonly perceived value of "hard-edged" or "crystal" rules in property law "is
that they signal to all of us, in a clear and distinct language, precisely what our
obligations are and how we may take care of our interests").
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we are not engaged in an ongoing business, family, religious or other
kind of long-term social relationship.3
At the same time, the value of legal certainty is often understood
from a specific philosophical and political orientation-grounded in
the theories of separation of powers and legal positivism-that seeks
to limit a judge's discretionary power to render decisions based on
sources and considerations other than the rules expressly stated in the
positive law. In other words, it reflects a desire to make the law, as
John Merryman puts it, essentially "judge-proof." The basic idea
behind this objective to limit judicial discretion is that "ifjudges are
not carefully controlled in the way they interpret legislation, the law
will be made more uncertain;" that is, "to give discretionary power
to the judge threatens the certainty of the law."' This desire to
restrict the sources of judges' ex-post decision making and law-
finding activities to codified or statutory sources of law found one
important early American expression in the codification movement
of the 1820s to 1850s,6 inspired by foreign born reformers like
Jeremy Bentham7 and William Sampson It also found early and
3. See Rose, supra note 2, at 602 ("The enforceability of clear rules enables
us to deal with the world of strangers" that extends beyond traditional geographic,
familial or religious communities. In other words, "[c]rystalline rules thus seem to
perform the service of creating a context in which strangers can deal with each
other in confidence.").
4. Merryman, supra note 1, at 48.
5. Id. at 49. The potential danger of a legal system in which the value of
certainty has failed and has been overridden by unbounded judicial discretion is
illustrated, "so the argument goes," according to Merryman, by the example of
German judges who "aggressively opted for judicial discretion at the expense of
certainty in the 1920s, both to justify their use of general clauses and to follow the
theory advanced by the 'free law' school of jurists," and who then, "[w]hen
darkness fell.., were unable to defend the legal order by calling on the importance
of certainty." Id. at 54. Unfortunately, Merryman does not tell us whether he
believes this historical assessment is accurate (he calls the issue "unimportant" for
purposes of his comparative sketch). Id. In his latest edition of the Civil Law
Tradition, however, he does observe that "[t]he obligatory reference to a 'source of
law' in [German post-World War I decisions confronting problems associated with
inflation] is an empty ritual that has little restraining effect on judges and, given the
rejection of stare decisis, can hardly contribute much to certainty." Id. at 53.
Compare John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 56 (1969) (not
containing the preceding statement).
6. See Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of
Antebellum Legal Reform 56-57 (1981) (citing instances in which supporters of
American codification linked threats to legal certainty with the risks of judicial
legislation and innovation).
7. See id. at 74-78, 97-103 (discussing influence of Jeremy Bentham on
American codification movement). Bentham, in fact, labeled judicial discretion as
the core reason that the common law resulted in legal uncertainty. See id. at 75
(' The common law method was oppressive because its 'very essence' made the law
uncertain. Judges made the common law, he declared, 'as a man makes laws for
[Vol. 631398
JOHN A. LOVET1
concrete expression in Louisiana law as well, for example, in the
Constitution of 1812s requirement that judges refer to the statutory
sources of their judgments.9 As this article will show, the quest for
legal certainty was undoubtedly a pressing concern from the very
inception of Louisiana's civil law tradition in the early nineteenth
century.
Perhaps more surprising to this article's readers, however, will be
the suggestion that goals often considered to be in competition with
legal certainty-flexibility and equity-have also consistently been
crucial values in Louisiana's legal culture. By the use of terms like
"flexibility" and "equity" in contrast with "legal certainty," judges
and scholars of the civil law (or of the common law for that matter)
usually mean the ability or practice of judges to bend or adapt the
requirements of fixed legal rules to respond to changing social
circumstances, unprecedented facts, or unique demands for fairness
presented by an individual case. 0 As Vernon Palmer puts it, the term
"equity," for instance, though capable of a variety of meanings, has
generally come to mean in Louisiana simply "the [judicial] exercise
of discretion in the pursuit of greater fairness."' 'Thus, although
certainty is often seen to be a preeminent goal in any legal system,
quite often we are content, in the language of Carol Rose, to
"substitute fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision for what seem to be
perfectly clear, open and shut, demarcations of entitlements."' 2 In
other words, "crystalline rules" tend to be "muddied repeatedly by
his dog.' When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he
does it and then you beat him for it. Being 'ex poste facto law,' the common law
was 'pregnant with insecurity' for the individual and his rights.") (quoting Jeremy
Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham V: 235; IV, 459,460 (John Bowring, ed.,
1962)).
8. See Cook, supra note 6, at 58-60, 106-10, 125-26 (discussing William
Sampson's critique of the common law and his influence on the American
codification movement); Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing
Society, 1776-1876 59-90 (1976) (same).
9. Vernon Palmer, Two Worlds in One: The Genesis of Louisiana's Mixed
Legal System, 1903-1812, in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction 36
(Vernon V. Palmer ed., 1999) [hereinafter Palmer, Two Worlds] (citing Louisiana
Constitution, art. IV, § 11 (1812)). But see Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr., A
History of the Louisiana Civil Code: The Formative Years, 1803-1839 76, n.60
(1987) (demonstrating through several decisions handed down between 1813 and
1817 how "the judges of the state supreme court showed themselves to be less than
enthusiastic for this constitutional curtailment of judicial discretion").
10. Tate, Techniques, supra note 1, at 748 (noting that "the need for some
flexibility" competes with the "demand for certainty of legal rule" and praising the
desirable flexibility shown by tort law to respond to changing social conditions);
Merryman, supra note 1, at 49.
11. Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A
Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 7, 11 (1994).
12. Rose, supra note 2, at 578.
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exceptions and equitable second-guessing, to the point that the
various claimants . . . don't know quite what their rights and
obligations are."' 13
The purpose of this article, which has been inspired by the efforts
of scholars and jurists from Louisiana, Quebec, France, and Spain to
celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Louisiana Purchase, r4 is to
begin to trace through the development of Louisiana law the
relationship between these supposedly competing goals of legal
certainty on one hand, and flexibility, equity, and perhaps even
uncertainty on the other. The article focuses first on the debate that
took place in the first years after the Louisiana Purchase over what
kind of private legal system Louisiana would create and recalls how
the principle of legal certainty was initially linked with both
legislative and judicial efforts to preserve the "ancient laws" of pre-
cession Louisiana. It then examines how the principle of legal
certainty became inextricably intertwined in often contradictory ways
in the struggle over whether and to what extent Louisiana would
secure an essentially codified system of private law, culminating in
the adoption of the 1825 Civil Code and the Great Repealing Act of
1828. It concludes with a brief reconsideration of one recent, late
twentieth century legal dispute that reveals the continuing relevance
of this tension between certainty on one hand and equity and
flexibility on the other.
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EARLY NINETEENTH
CENTURY LOUISIANA
A. The Anxieties of 1806: Land, Slaves and "the Frightful Chaos
of the Common Law"
Between 1803 and 1812, the period between the Louisiana
Purchase and statehood, concerns about legal certainty were closely
interwoven with the question of what kind of private law system
Louisiana would adopt and what the authorized sources of law in that
system would be. Quite frequently this period has been characterized
as a "clash of legal cultures," a clash between the common law
culture of newly arrived Americans and American governmental
officials and the civil law culture of Louisiana's ancient inhabitants. 5
13. Id. at 578-79.
14. This article grows out of a paper delivered by the author at the conference,
"Louisiana Bicentenary: A Fusion of Legal Cultures, 1803-2003," sponsored by the
Association Henri Capitant (Louisiana Chapter) and the LSU Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, May 15-16, 2003.
15. See George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal
Traditions (1975) (dedicated to thesis that territorial era is best explained in terms
1400 [Vol. 63
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Occasionally, however, this traditional historiography of the period
has been questioned.
In the 1940s, for instance, Mitchell Franklin claimed that the era
was dominated by a clash, not between civil and common law, but
between two kinds of civil law: "emancipatory," revolutionary,
Jeffersonian republicanism and its ideological cousin revolutionary
French civil law versus "counter-revolutionary," "medieval,"
"feudal," Spanish civil law.16 Decades later, the academic debate
of clash of common law and civil law traditions); John T. Hood, The History and
Development of the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 7, 8-10 (1958) (positing
Edward Livingston as decisive figure in leading local opposition to Claiborne's plan
to establish common law in bitter contest between rival legal systems); Elizabeth
Gaspar Brown, Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1804-1812, 1 Am. J.
Leg. Hist. 35, 36-59 (1957) (chronicling developments as conflict between civil
law and common law civilizations); Samuel B. Groner, Louisiana Law: Its
Development in the First Quarter Century ofAmerican Rule, 8 La. L. Rev. 350, 372
(1948) (observing "the balance in the struggle over what system of law should
prevail in Louisiana has swung definitely away from the common law"); Henry P.
Dart, The Place of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 163, 168-69 (1930)
(depicting battle between local advocacy of civil law and Claiborne and Jefferson's
advocacy of common law); John H. Wigmore, Louisiana: The Story of Its Legal
System, 1 So. L. Q. 1, 12 (1916) (claiming influx of common law lawyers sought
to secure common law and were resisted by native lawyers and Livingston who
believed in superiority of civil law). In recent years, this traditional view focusing
on a clash of cultures has been given new life by Vernon Palmer and James Viator,
who, in explaining how Louisiana ended up as a mixed jurisdiction, have
emphasized the then dominant French linguistic and cultural character of the native
Louisiana population. Palmer, Two Worlds, supra note 9, at 28-33; Vernon V.
Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: Historical Debates
and Contemporary Evaluation ofFrench Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 La.
L., Rev. 106-7 (2004); James E. Viator, Book Review, 33 Amer. J. Legal Hist. 368,
370 (1989) (reviewing, Richard Holcombe Kilboume, Jr., A History of the
Louisiana Civil Code: The Formative Years, 1803-1839 (1987)) (suggesting that
a linguistic "cultural crisis" also played a significant role in clash over legal
systems). See also John H. Tucker, The Code and The Common Law in Louisiana,
in The Code Napoleon and the Common Law World, 345, 355 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1954) (contending it was natural for commissioners who drafted 1808 Digest
to turn to Code Napoleon as source because Louisiana was "at that time
predominantly French" and had "endured Spanish laws imposed a generation earlier
against its will"); Dart, supra at 168 (contending that, after Louisiana purchase,
French Louisiana residents experienced a return of "mental allegiance to the
country of their origin").
16. Mitchell Franklin, The Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of
Spanish Medieval Law from Louisiana, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 319, 320-23 (1942)
[hereinafter Frandin, Place of Thomas Jefferson]; Mitchell Franklin, The
Eighteenth Brumaire in Louisiana: Talleyrand and the Spanish Medieval Legal
System of 1806, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 514, 515 (1942) [hereinafter Franklin, Eighteenth
Brumaire]. Samuel Groner also seems to have been influenced by and receptive to
Franklin's theories that the real clash was between reactionary Spanish civil law
and revolutionary French civil law. Groner, supra note 15, at 367, 371(citing and
quoting Mitchell Franklin's work interpreting the era). Years later, Franklin still
2003] 1401
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between Professors Rodolfo Batiza and Robert Pascal over the actual
sources of the Digest of 1808 also reflected, at least at some level, an
understanding that there was a battle for dominance between two
kinds of civil law, largely post-revolutionary French-Roman law and
pre-revolutionary Spanish-Roman law.17  Most recently, legal
historians Richard Kilbourne, Mark Fernandez and Judith Schafer
have rejected the Kulterkampf interpretation of this period.
Kilbourne and Schafer suggest that economic factors motivated the
local inhabitants' resistance to common law intrusion as much as any
cultural allegiance to Spanish or French civil law."8 Kilbourne and
Fernandez also argue that jurisprudential and structural developments
occurring in Louisiana legal culture at that time were remarkably
similar to developments occurring elsewhere in the antebellum South
and the United States, particularly to the extent common law
methodology was employed by Louisiana courts in both the territorial
period and in the first several decades after statehood. 19 The purpose
of revisiting this period, however, is not to reexamine these
historiographical claims about the nature and depth of any local
saw a clash between French and Spanish civil law but modified his views on which
tradition had prevailed after he had the opportunity to review the de la Vergne copy
of the 1808 Digest containing notes purportedly made by Moreau Lislet and dating
from 1814. The omission of any references to the Code Napoleon in these notes
suggested to Franklin an intent, perhaps of misdirection, to orient Louisiana law
"toward the Spanish feudal law and away from the bourgeois French Civil Code of
1804." Mitchell Franklin, An Important Document in the History of American
Roman andCivilLaw: theDeLa Vergne Manuscript, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 35,36 (1958)
[hereinafter Franklin, Important Document].
17. See Rufolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 4, 11 (1971) (classifying sources as
predominantly French, including seventy percent from French Projet of 1800 and
French Civil Code of 1804); id. at 28 (characterizing Digest's provisions on certain
family law matters as using a "strikingly liberal and egalitarian approach for its
time"); Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 603, 608 (1972) (arguing that drafters of Digest only
"borrowed phraseology from French legal writings to prepare, in the French
language and in civil code form, as directed by the Territorial Assembly, a
statement of law so closely based on the Spanish-Roman civil laws in force that it
could be entitled a 'Digest' of those laws").
18. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 8, 9, 13 and 21; Judith Kelleher Schafer,
Slavery, the Civil Law and the Supreme Court of Louisiana 4 (1994); see also infra
notes 40-45 and accompanying text discussing Kilbourne and Schafer's claims in
relation to Manifesto of 1806.
19. Mark F. Fernandez, From Chaos to Continuity, The Evolution of
Louisiana's Judicial System, 1712-1862 16-39, 55-88, 87 (2001) ("judges of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana worked in exactly the same fashion as their brethren
on Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals"); Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 63--64
(suggesting that administration ofjustice in early Louisiana "was much influenced
in practice by common law methodology" and that courts "adopted a pattern ofjurisprudential thinking markedly akin to that of other states of the Union").
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attachment to the civil law or any particular variant of the civil law
tradition, but to gauge what role the concept of legal certainty played
in the contemporary debates over the newly emerging legal system.
One episode from the territorial period that merits particular
examination for the purpose of understanding the role of legal
certainty in these debates emerges from the territorial legislature's
attempt in 1806 to establish Spanish civil law as the reigning
substantive private law of the territory and the intense reaction
provoked by rejection of this legislative initiative. In early 1806,
perhaps sensing that something had to be done to secure civil law as
the substantive law of the territory,2" the general assembly of both the
Legislative Council and the House of Representatives of the Territory
of Orleans attempted to enact what Rodolfo Batiza calls "a rather
curious legal system predominantly based on Roman, Spanish and
other civil law sources"'" then in force in the territory, including the
Laws of Toro, French commentators like Domat, the Commentaries
of Valin, and the Ordinance of Bilbao.22 In fact, there is a general
consensus that the purpose of this proposed legislation was not just
to implant the Spanish Civil law, but to clarify the precise content of
the Spanish law then in force and, in particular, which laws and
authors could be consulted, and to block generally the reception of
the common law.23
The Act, however, was promptly vetoed by the Tennessee lawyer
and provisional governor, William C.C. Claiborne, on May 26,
perhaps because Claiborne sought to prevent the wholesale reception
of any legal system until a later date when demographic
Americanization would have allowed reception of the common law
instead,24 or perhaps because he merely thought the act was
redundant since he assumed Spanish law was already in place.25 In
20. Dargo, supra note 15, at 135-36 (describing series of events and
publications in late 1805 that signaled not only replacement of procedural and
institutional aspects of civil law with common law alternatives, but risk that
substantive civil law could be lost as well).
21. Batiza, supra note 17, at 6.
22. Id. n.20; Dargo, supra note 15, at 135-36; Kilboume, supra note 9, at 39.
The manuscript of the proposed legislative act, now housed in the National
Archives, is reproduced in Franklin, Place of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 16 at
323-26, and in Brown, supra note 15, at 46-48.
23. Pascal, supra note 17, at 605, n.12. Palmer, Two Worlds, supra note 9, at
33; Dargo, supra note 15, at 135-36.
24. See Dargo, supra note 15, at 25 (on Claiborne's early career), 116, 130 (on
Claiborne's views on Americanization of law); Palmer, Two Worlds, supra note 9,
at 3 (same).
25. See Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 59 (noting that Claiborne's veto may not
have been motivated by antipathy towards a civilian private law regime as
traditional Louisiana legal scholarship assumed, but perhaps because he simply
2003] 1403
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any event, regardless of his motivations, Claibome's veto
immediately inspired the Legislative Council, the upper and still
unelected of the two houses that formed the first representative
26assembly in the Louisiana territory, to adopt a resolution purporting
to dissolve itself.2" The legislature's resolution of self-dissolution, an
act of protest against Claiborne's perceived obstruction to legislative
recognition of the ancient laws, appeared a few days later in local
newspapers and was immediately labeled "a Manifesto" by
Claiborne 28 an appellation still observed by many Louisiana legal
scholars.2
This so-called Manifesto couched its condemnation of Governor
Claiborne's veto in melodramatic terms that overtly appealed to the
ideal of certainty in the law. At the outset, however, the Manifesto
discounted one source of possible legal uncertainty that troubled
other contemporary observers of American law-widespread
variation in private law from state to state.30 Rather than decry these
believed it was unnecessary as "none of the institutions of Spanish law had ever
ceased to have the force of law"); see also Dargo, supra note 15, at 137 (same).
26. For discussion of the membership of the Legislative Council at this time,
see Dargo, supra note 15, at 48. Dargo explains that after the March 2, 1805 Act
of Congress, the formerly thirteen member Legislative Council, id. at 29, was
converted to a five member council. Id. at 48. Ten candidates for council
membership were to be nominated by the newly established and elected House of
Representatives, from which five members would be chosen by the President and
approved by the Senate. Id. When the first newly constituted Legislative Council
met in the spring of 1806 in time for the crisis leading to the Manifesto, all five
members had French backgrounds reflecting the French dominance in the recently
elected House of Representatives. Id.
27. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 10, 36-37and 39-40; Dargo, supra note 15, at
136-67; A.N. Yiannopoulos,A Requiemfora Civil Code, A Commemorative Essay,
78 Tul. L. Rev. 379 (2003).
28. See Letter of Governor Claiborne to the Secretary of State, June 3, 1806,
in The Territorial Papers of The United States, IX, The Territory of Orleans
1803-1812 642 (Clarence E. Carter ed. 1940) [hereinafter Territorial Papers]. The
actual text of the Manifesto in both its original French and English translation, as
excerpted from Le Telegraphe, June 3, 1806, is reproduced in Territorial Papers,
supra, at 643-657. Apparently, the resolution of dissolution was passed in the
legislative council but narrowly failed to pass in the elected house of
representatives, although it did receive 10 votes there. Dargo, supra note 15, at
137.
29. Yiannopoulos, Requiem, supra note 27, at 4; Palmer, Two Worlds, supra
note 9, at 33-34; Dargo, supra note 15, at 136.
30. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30 (identifying state to state variations in law
affecting commerce, contracts, real property, and descent as one of the sources of
legal uncertainty that troubled lawyers and laymen during the period between 1776
and 1815 because "the reality of the federal system, with its numerous, largely
autonomous jurisdictions" seemed to contradict the promotion of "transcendent,
enduring legal principles" associated with English common law); see also Peter
Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 Va. L.
[Vol. 631404
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"differences in local law," the Manifesto, in fact, praised Congress
for not imposing a "uniform common law" on all the States and
allowing them the freedom to preserve and modify their private law
as they see fit.3" The Manifesto thus lauded Congress for similarly
allowing the Territory of Orleans "the privilege of keeping its old
laws or changing or modifying them according as its legislatures
might find it necessary. "32
Picking up rhetorical steam, the Manifesto next focused on those
"old laws" which "everyone knows... are nothing but the civil or
Roman law"33 and linked them to the ideal of certainty:
In any case it is no less true that the Roman law which
formed the basis of the civil and political laws of the civilized
nations of Europe presents an ensemble of greatness and
prudence which is above all criticism. Whatpurity there is in
those decisions based on natural equity; what clearness there
is in the wording which is the work of the great jurists,
encouraged by the wisest emperors; what simplicity there is
in the form of those contracts and what sure and quick means
there are for obtaining the remedies prescribed by the law, for
the reparations of all kinds of civil wrongs....
But it is a question here of overthrowing received and
generally known usages and the uncertainty with which they
would be replaced would be as unjust as disheartening.3 4
Notice the cluster of terms "purity," "clearness," "simplicity," "sure
and quick means"--all synonymous with certainty-that are
associated with the "old laws," that is, with the Roman and civil law
traditions to which the legislators wished to adhere. In contrast,
should the old law and its "generally known usages" be cast aside,
Rev. 403, 416-17 (1966) (pointing to observations ofUnited States Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story and suggesting that a "multiplicity of jurisdictions and the
mass of judicial opinions" led to legal elite's interest in civil law as a way to
"counteract the centrifugal tendencies" this multiplicity produced).
31. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 651-52. Here, the Manifesto is
referring to the second of Congress' two organic acts addressing the government
of the Territory of Orleans, the Act of March 2, 1805, by which Congress provided
that "[t]he laws which shall be in force in the said Territory at the cormnencement
of this act, and not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, shall continue in force,
until altered, modified or repealed by the Legislature." Id. at 650-51. See Act of
March 2, 1805, An Act Further Providing for the Government of the Territory of
Orleans, 2 Stat. 322, art. 4 (1805), discussed in Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 10-11;
Dargo, supra note 15, at 128, 136 (noting ambiguity of Act of March 2, 1805
because of its sanctioning of "civil law in some respects and common law in
others").
32. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 652.
33. Id. at 652-53.
34. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
2003] 1405
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what the legislators feared would result was nothing less than an
"unjust" and "disheartening" "uncertainty., 31 In short, continuity of
the law, it was assumed, promoted certainty of the law; conversely,
discontinuity provoked uncertainty.36
But having established this linkage between preservation of the
old laws and the qualities of a legal order characterized by legal
certainty, the Manifesto also suggested that the concept of legal
certainty was not only a proxy for cultural affinity and continuity, but
had pragmatic connotations as well. Indeed, toward the end of the
Manifesto, the legislators claimed that the local inhabitants possessed
a widespread and deep understanding37 of such topics as "how
successions are transferred," and "the manner of selling, of
exchanging or alienating one's properties with sureness." '38
Moreover, if the ancient inhabitants were forced to "[s]ubstitute new
laws for the old laws," and the legal certainty these old laws
presumably guaranteed, among the grave consequences that would
certainly follow, according to the legislators, would be a tragic
undermining "of the facility and sureness of transfers."39 In other
35. Interestingly, the very word "uncertainty' (or "'incertitude" in French) is
repeated three more times in the Manifesto. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at
654, 655, 656.
36. Dargo interprets the Manifesto primarily in political terms as an expression
of the local inhabitants' natural desire to obtain legal continuity. Dargo, supra note
15, at 137-38 ("The sudden political transformation from one government to
another made legal continuity an absolute necessity.").
37. The authors of the Manifesto claimed that an appreciation for legal
certainty, the ability to predict the legal consequences of one's actions and juridical
acts, was not restricted to the elite and educated members of their own social class
but extended to "[e]ach of the inhabitants dispersed over the vast expanse of this
Territory, however little educated he may be" because each inhabitant "has sucked
this knowledge at his mother's breast, he has received it by the tradition of his
forefathers and he has perfected it by the experience of a long and laborious life."
Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 653. Of course, not everyone agreed that this
understanding of legal rules and norms was so all pervasive in the first decade of
the nineteenth century in Louisiana. Governor Claiborne, in fact, suggested that
"knowledge of the Laws, by which we were governed, was extremely confined" to
the "Lawyers." Ferdinand Stone, The Civil Code of 1808 for the Territory of
Orleans, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1958) (quoting letter of Governor Claiborne to James
Madison, dated April 5, 1808, in 4 Official Letter Books of W.C.C. Claiborne
(1801-1816) 168 (Rowland ed. 1917) [hereinafter Claiborne Letters]. Moreover,
the local bar, it has been estimated, numbered only twenty in 1805, out of which only
a dozen seem to have been active before the Supreme Court of the Territory of
Orleans during the eight years of its existence. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 5, n. 15, 59.
38. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 653.
39. Id. The authors of the Manifesto elaborated at length on this point: "Who
will dare to sign a contract under a new regime the effects of which will not be
known to him? What will be the lot of the inhabitant who is so unfortunate as not
to have received sufficient education to earn these new laws .... Will he not
shudder every time that he wishes to dispose of his properties." Id.
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words, despite its noble language and its self-conscious effort to link
itself to the origins of the civil law tradition, the Manifesto's
obsession with "sureness of transfers" and its alarm about
"exchanging or alienating one's properties" suggested more practical
concerns. The sources of those pragmatic concerns are not difficult
to imagine.
According to several scholars, the two most significant
obsessions of the Legislative Council, and of all of elite Louisiana at
the time of the Manifesto, were not so much the continuation of "the
legal institutions in which property rights were embodied," but rather
two pragmatic economic concerns intimately associated with those
property rights-the pejetuation of slavery and "the validation of
[colonial] land grants.' As for slavery, legal historian Judith
Kelleher Schafer, following the insights of Mitchell Franklin, goes so
far as to claim that the local elites' fear that Jefferson and the new
American government would prohibit slavery was the "underlying
cause" for their legislative efforts in 1806 to retain the Spanish civil
law.4 1  As for the question of land grants, Richard Kilbourne
suggests, and early case law confirms, that the territorial legislature
was not worried so much about which "laws governing the
transmission of propertyper se" should be adopted, but rather, about
how to confect an acceptable "system of recordation of land transfers
and procedures for certifying colonial land grants." '42 Support for
40. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 11. The general concern of native Louisianians
about perceived Congressional threats to the perpetuation of slavery in general and
the importation of slaves in particular was closely intertwined with their concern
over land titles. See id. at 8, 9, 13, 21 (discussing local concerns over slavery and
land titles).
41. Schafer, supra note 18, at 4. Like Schafer, id. at 5-6, Mitchell Franklin
cites statements of Thomas Paine to support the theory that the perpetuation of
slavery was one of the primary reasons that the territorial legislators sought to enact
a "medieval Spanish legal system" in 1806. Franklin, Place of Thomas Jefferson,
supra note 16, at 321. Franklin likewise contends that "[t]he French inhabitants of
Louisiana were ... above all anxious to maintain slavery, the security of which
was jeopardized by President Jefferson." Id. at 328. See also Franklin, Eighteenth
Brumaire, supra note 16, at 516 (claiming that the essential purpose of the
territorial legislature's actions in 1806 was "to shatter the political unity of
American territorial Louisiana, and to defend negro slavery in Louisiana from the
assaults made on it by President Jefferson"). George Dargo similarly notes the
local inhabitants' concerns about federal limitations on slave importation imposed
by the first organic law addressing the government of the territory on March 26,
1804. Dargo, supra note 15, at 29-30.
42. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 30. As Kilbourne explains, "there was
widespread anxiety over the future of land grants throughout the Louisiana Purchase
territories after the cession, and that anxiety was particularly intense in the Orleans
Territory because of the significant concentration there of post-colonial inhabitants
living on French and Spanish law grants." Id. In an 1812 decision, the Louisiana
Supreme Court attested to the source of this anxiety by noting that individuals
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both of these assessments can be found in an 1807 letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson in which Jefferson observed that
two of the primary sources of local dissatisfaction in Louisiana in the
period prior to the enactment of the Digest-besides anxiety about
the administration of justice in foreign "forms, principles and
language" and the corruption of "bankrupt and greedy
lawyers"--were Louisianians' fears that the importation of slaves
would be prohibited and that their weakly documented land titles
would be rejected by newly established land commissioners. 43
Although the United States Congress, Claiborne, and other American
officials may have been more sensitive to this concern about weakly
documented land titles than the local inhabitants gave them credit
for," "the importance of the land claims problem in the context of
Louisiana's political and legal environment can hardly be
overemphasized."',
Because the authors of the Manifesto linked the survival of their
land titles, and their closely interrelated property rights in the slaves
who exploited those lands,' to the survival of pre-cession Spanish
(and French) law governing those property rights, it is hardly
surprising that the Manifesto spoke with such intensity about the
consequences of "overthrowing received and generally known usages
and the uncertainty with which they would be replaced.' t 7 In short,
the concept of legal certainty here can be seen operating through the
Manifesto in a decidedly functional and utilitarian manner. The local
asserting title to land originating in Spanish colonial land grants often could only
point to unsealed petitions from Spanish governors to their purported ancestors in
title, "it being seldom the case that the incipient right acquired by the governor's
signature, ripened into a formal grant." Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 138, 139
(La. 1812).
43. Franklin, Place of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 16, at 334-35 (quoting
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, Jan. 13, 1807, in 10 The Works of
Thomas Jefferson 540 (Federal ed. 1905)).
44. See Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 10-12, 16, 38 (suggesting Congress' and
Jefferson's "sensitivity" on part of federal government to land grant problem was
not appreciated by local inhabitants who feared divesture of their property rights).
45. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 34.
46. Positive evidence of the close connection between the local inhabitants'
property rights in their land and their property rights in the slaves who worked those
lands can be found in the explicit linkage of these two sets of rights in the 1808
Digest, which provided that "[s]laves in this territory are considered as immovable
by the operation of law, on account of their value and utility for the cultivation of
lands." Digest of 1808, Bk. II, tit. 1, Ch. 2, art. 19, at 98. This linkage was
continued in Article 461of the 1825 Civil Code which provided: "[s]laves, though
movable by their nature, are considered as inmovables, by the operation of law."
La. Civ. Code art. 461 Morgan ed., 1854). For discussion of the confusion and
contradictions created by the legal classification of slaves as immovable property,
see Schafer, supra note 18, at 25-26.
47. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 652-53.
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inhabitants seem to have promoted legal certainty through continuity
of the old Spanish laws in force, not only because of a professed
cultural attachment to those laws, but because such laws were
perceived to have the greatest likelihood of guaranteeing their
investments in land and slaves.
Can the Manifesto, however, also be read to illustrate the other,
more political or philosophical (and essentially negative)
understanding of legal certainty-the "brooding anxiety about
certainty"'48 that a civil law observer like John Merryman has found
hovering over the entire legal process in the civil law tradition, an
anxiety that reflects what was earlier described as the civil law's
desire to make the law essentially "judge-proof?"'9 According to
Merryman, each of the key players in the legal process of a civil law
system-the scholar, the legislator and the judge-has a particular
role to play in relation to this "brooding anxiety about certainty" in
the civil law: The legal scholar's task is to "make the law more
certain by making it systematic;" the legislator's task is to make the
law more certain by stating it "completely, clearly and coherently;"
and, finally, "fjudges are restricted to interpretation and application
of 'the law' in the interest of certainty," and thus their "prior judicial
decisions are not "law."5 Can we see any of this classic French
civilian, Sampsonite or Benthamite" preference for valuing positive,
written law over judicial discretion reflected in the Manifesto's
statements about certainty?
At the outset, we should acknowledge that at the time of the 1806
Manifesto there may well have been only a few individuals located
in or associated with Louisiana-namely, Thomas Jefferson, Edward
Livingston, and perhaps C.C. Claibome-who possessed any
appreciation, as Richard Kilboume puts it, "of the contemporary
notion of absolute separation of powers and its counterpart,
legislative positivism, postulated by Jeremy Bentham and fostered by
48. Merryman, supra note 1, at 82.
49. Id. at 48; see also supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
51. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. See also C.J. Friedrich, The
Ideological and Philosophical Background, and Andre Tunc, The Grand Outlines
of the Code, in The Code Napoleon and the Common Law World 1, 7-11 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1956) (discussing philosophical heritage of Code Napoleon and
contemporary understanding of roles of legislator and judge); Andre Tunc, The
Grand Outlines of the Code, in The Code Napoleon and the Common Law World
19,26-28 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956) (explaining classic French understanding
of judicial decisions as secondary or supplementary sources of law and of the
respective tasks of the legislator and of the courts), Merryman, supra note 1, at
28-29 (discussing fear of judicial lawmaking in pre-revolutionary France and its
relation to stress on complete separation of powers).
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the French Revolution."52  Nevertheless, despite the limited
penetration of this legal ideology in Louisiana, some of the
Manifesto's language is still interestingly suggestive of the civil
law's idealized concern for this kind of philosophical and politically
oriented certainty. Notice, for starters, that after explaining the
reasons for their attachment to the old Spanish legislation, the
Manifesto's authors' first and fundamental proposed solution was to
create a foundational civil code:
The first legislature of this Territory has to be particularly
interested in establishing the fundamental bases; the
secondary laws, accessory laws and details should only come
later .... Now what is the first law, the most important law in
the present situation of this country; what is the fundamental
basis of the great edifice of its future legislation? It cannot be
denied that it is the matter of giving to it a civil code. 3
Next, the Manifesto justifies the need for a code by appealing to the
classic revolutionary civilian goal of creating a universally accessible
source of law-that is, the desire "to place within the reach of all
citizens, both in the French and English languages, a complete
collection of the laws governing us."54  Further, although the
Manifesto does not envision that this new proposed Code will
constitute a radical substantive departure from the old laws, it
analogizes the proposed code to "a sure compass which will facilitate
the decision of the old lawsuits as well as the new without leaving
anything to arbitrary opinion.""5 In other words, this directional
metaphor implies that the code would be designed to prevent judicial
arbitrariness, a condition associated with "the frightful chaos of the
common law."56 Finally, observe the concluding explanation of the
purpose of the act vetoed by Claiborne:
The Legislature attached great importance to this bill for the
purpose of clarifying our present judicial system and doing
away with its uncertainty, until it should have time to draw up
52. Kilbourne, supra note 9; see id. at 30, 42-43, 56, 59, 63 (similarly
expressing doubt about the degree to which legislative positivism had penetrated
Louisiana legal culture in the period prior and up to the enactment of the Digest of
1808).
53. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 653.
54. Id. at 654. For discussions of the importance of universal accessibility of
the law in the French civil law tradition, see Merryman, supra note 1, at 28;
Friedrich, supra note 51, at 10; Tunc, supra note 51, at 22-23; Shael Herman, The
Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States 11, 19 (1993).
55. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 654.
56. Id. at 655. See also Cook, supra note 6, at 15, 54-55 (noting contemporary
American concerns about the arbitrary nature ofjustice under the common law).
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a civil code. The legislature considered this provision as a
safeguard against dangerous innovations and a measure
necessary to the tranquility of the citizens.:
Although the need for "clarifying our present judicial system" and
"doing away with uncertainty" might only have reflected an anxiety
about which Spanish or French sources would be used to preserve
property rights in colonial land grants and slaves, the Manifesto's
professed desire for a code to control "arbitrary opinion," its fear of
the "chaos of the common law," its allusion to "dangerous
innovations," and its expectation that a "civil code" will soon be
drafted to remedy this "uncertainty," also contained the rhetorical
seeds of another kind of anxiety, an anxiety supposedly peculiar to
the civil law tradition and based on a philosophical attachment to the
value ofpositive law.58 Stronger evidence of this other, more political
kind of understanding of legal certainty, however, emerged just a few
years later from the pen of Governor Claiborne.
On October 22, 1808, in his circular letter to the local parish
judges that followed the actual delivery of copies of the brand new
Digest of 1808, Claiborne, the legislators' partner in this dance
around the issue of legal certainty, observed:
It being understood by our Courts of Justice that the
principles of the Civil Law (except in Criminal cases) were in
force thro'out the Territory, it became expedient to place
them before the Public. Heretofore few citizens had a
knowledge of the Civil Law; it was spread over innumerable
Volumes, and was for the most part, written in a Language
which few could read. The uncertainty of the Law, was a
source of great embarrassment, not only to private
individuals, but to the Magistrate who was to administer it.
By the adoption of the Digest, one desirable object is at least
effected. The laws are rendered more certain, and if in their
operation they should be found unjust, the legislature will, I
am persuaded, loose [sic] no time in making the necessary
amendments.5 9
In the same vein, only a few weeks earlier in a letter to James
Madison also enclosing a copy of the new Digest, Claiborne used
similar language to describe his primary reason for approving what
he called the "Civil Code:"
57. Id. at 656.
58. Supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
59. Stone, supra note 37 (quoting 4 Claiborne Letters, supra note 37, at 220)
(emphasis added).
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Heretofore, few citizens had any knowledge of the existing
Laws; not even the Magistrates, whose duty it was to
execute them.-Under these conditions, I could not do
otherwise than sanction the Code. My frst object has been
to render the Laws more certain....
Here, on one hand, Claiborne agreed with the authors of the
Manifesto that "uncertainty of the Law" was a source of "great
embarrassment." But unlike the previously frustrated legislators,
Claibome did not perceive the greatest source of uncertainty to lie
in the substitution of new laws for old, but in a continuation of the
dispersal of the old law in "innumerable Volumes," that is in an
un-redacted, undigested form.6' Certainty, on the other hand, was
to be achieved not merely by a continuation of the old laws in
force, but in a tentative codification, the "one desirable object" of
which-indeed the "first object" of which-was that "[t]he laws
are made more certain." Finally, but importantly, as Claiborne
seemed to warn in his letter to the judges, it would be up to the
legislature, not the judges, to perfect this new vehicle for achieving
certainty. In short, at least for Claiborne, who by 1808 had begun
to feel much stronger bonds of affection for the local inhabitants,
certainty would now be achieved not merely by continuity of the
old laws, but by something new-not exactly discontinuity-but
something different than what the authors of the Manifesto of 1806
had in mind.62 Of course, as the next section will remind us,
Louisiana courts did not necessarily share Claiborne's faith in
legislative supremacy in the first decades following the adoption
of the Digest.
60. Territorial Papers, supra note 28, at 802 (emphasis added) (Letter of
Claiborne to James Madison, Oct. 7, 1808).
61. This concern about uncertainty resulting from a vast dispersal of sources
in a profusion of legal texts was common throughout American in the first thirty
years of the nineteenth century and was one of the motivating factors behind the
American codification movement. See Cook, supra note 6, at 50 ("By 1820,
widespread grievances were again heard that the law was uncertain, but for the
opposite reason: dearth was replaced by a no less troublesome deluge of legal
materials."). See also Stein, supra note 30, at 416-17 ("The mass of the law is, to
be sure, accumulating with an almost incredible rapidity.... It is impossible not to
look without some discouragement upon the ponderous volumes which the next half
century will add to the groaning shelves of our jurists.") (quoting Joseph Story,
Address to the Suffolk Bar, 1 American Jurist 1, 13-14 (1929)).
62. See Dargo, supra note 15, at 169 (discussing Claiborne's mature
appreciation for and affinity with local ancient inhabitants by 1808); but see
Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 59 (suggesting that neither Claiborne nor members of
the territorial legislature had any philosophical grounding in legislative positivism).
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B. Certainty and Resistance to Codification
As we have seen, tensions and contradictions were inherent in the
legal debates leading up to the adoption of the 1808 Digest.
Although the authors of the 1806 Manifesto primarily believed that
legal certainty would be achieved by preserving application of the
"ancient," predominantly Spanish-Roman, laws then in force, they
also hinted at a proto-positivistic faith in a new codified legal order.'
Someone like Governor Claiborne ironically seems to have shared
with Edward Livingston the leader of the native Louisianians' drive
to preserve the civil law, the belief that certainty would be promoted
by continual legislative refinement of a new source of positive law.65
It turns out that these contradictory assumptions about certainty
would come into increasingly overt conflict after adoption of the
1808 Digest. In fact, actual developments in the courts and in the
legislature after statehood frustrated the goal of achievement of legal
certainty held by most of the participants in these early debates.
It is now well recognized that the conflict between the Louisiana
Supreme Courts' predilection to act as if legal certainty could best be
achieved by continuing preservation of "ancient" laws and the
legislature's determination to take increasingly firm steps toward a
more radical style of codification that limited the authoritative
sources of law and broke sharply with the past produced chaotic
problems of legal uncertainty.6 This legal uncertainty arose most
dramatically when the Digest or the Civil Code of 1825 did not
expressly contradict or repeal prior Spanish law and the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in important cases like Cottin v. Cottin 7 and Cole's
Widow v. His Executors," resorted to applying pre-codification
Spanish law in spite of the existence of the newly drafted Digest and
63. Supra notes 21-23, 32-36, 45-58 and accompanying text.
64. Edward Livingston's conception of an idealized process for "continual
recodification" through ongoing reports by the judiciary to the legislature regarding
ambiguous provisions in the code is described in Clarence J. Morrow, Louisiana
Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Methodfor State and Nation, 18 Tul. L.
Rev. 351, 392-93 (1943).
65. Supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
66. See generally Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 61-95 (demonstrating post-i 812
decisions of Louisiana Supreme Court tended to diminish authority of Digest); id.
at 134-39, 144-64 (same with respect to post 1825 decisions and Civil Code of
1825); Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a Code - The Birth of a Digest, 63 Tul. L.
Rev. 221, 243-50 (1988) (recounting sequence of judicial decisions spawning
chaotic uncertainty as result of incomplete repeal in Digest of 1808 and Civil Code
of 1825 of prior existing Spanish law); Groner, supra note 15, at 375 (1948)
(commenting on "baffling m6lange of legal perplexity and uncertainty" that resulted
from judicial resistance to treat Digest as completely repealing prior law).
67. 5 Mart. (n.s.) 93 (La. 1817).
68. 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41 (La. 1828).
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later the Civil Code of 1825.69 As early as 1814, several years prior
to the Cottin decision, an observer like Claiborne, using language
reminiscent of his 1808 correspondence with the local judges and
Madison, advised the new state legislature that the odd and
"voluminous" mixture of "civil, common and statute law" that could
be applied in many cases prevented lawyers from being able to
predict legal consequences for their clients, and, therefore, he called
for a series of simplifying "compilation[s]" on various subjects to
remedy the "glorious uncertainty" currently confronting the layman
and the lawyer.70
By looking beyond Cottin and Cole 's Widow to a host of cases
covering a wide variety of subjects, recent scholarship has
consistently emphasized the depth of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
hostility to the notion that either the 1808 Digest or the 1825 Civil
Code could constitute a complete and radical break from prior
Spanish law,71 despite the increasingly strong evidence of a
69. Cottin and Cole's Widow are both discussed extensively in Palmer, Death
ofa Code, supra note 66, at 242-48; Kilboume, supra note 9, at 65-70; Fernandez,
supra note 19, at 72-73.
70. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 106 (quoting Claiborne speech of January 4,
1814). As Charles Cook has persuasively demonstrated, concerns about the
uncertainty of the law were abundant throughout America in the period between
1776 and 1815, and these concerns were a prime motivation for the American
codification movement that lasted roughly between 1820 and 1850. See Cook,
supra note 6, at 3-18 (chronicling and discussing sources of perceived uncertainty
between 1776 and 1815), and at 54-55 (same concerns about "glorious uncertainty"
between 1815 and 1830). As Cook explains, lawyers often complained about
inaccessible and uncertain legal sources and materials, laymen lamented the
unnecessary technicality and complexity of the law, and many laymen and lawyers
alike were troubled by the largely English and foreign form and content of the law.
Id. at 5. Summarizing the problematic state of legal materials, Cook writes, "it was
a time... when statute law was, at best, inaccessible and the common law was
often little better than slippery darkness." Id. at 12. These problems were not
easily resolved and in many ways were magnified in subsequent years according
to Cook as the volume of American law reports and statutes multiplied rapidly,
creating further concerns about uncertainty. Id. at 47-50.
71. See Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 61-95 (demonstrating that post-1812
decisions of Louisiana Supreme Court, including but not limited to Cottin, tended
to diminish authority of Digest); id. at 134-39 & 144-64 (same with respect to
decisions following enactment of Civil Code of 1825); Fernandez, supra note 19,
at 62-73 (same with respect to decisions from 1812 through Cottin). It is worth
noting, however, as Kilbourne has observed, that "the judiciary's disinclination to
accept the Digest of 1808 as 'a premier statement of law' was not absolutely
foreordained." Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 69. In fact, several early decisions after
statehood but predating Cottin demonstrate the willingness of some lawyers andjudges to argue for or recognize that the Digest had repealed the Spanish law in
force at least where the Digest and the ancient laws were in direct conflict on the
same subject. See, e.g., Cavelier & Petit v. Collins, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 188, 191 (La.
1813) (suggesting that the Digest, and not prior Spanish law, can provide rule of
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legislative intent to accomplish such a result in Article 3521 of the
1825 Civil Code,72 and then in the Great Repealing Act of 1828. 73
Indeed, in the years following Cottin, it became clear that judges and
presumably many lawyers considered that "the Spanish law was
Louisiana's common law" and that, in their minds at least, the Digest
of 1808 was not a revolutionary Civil Code which had broken
dramatically with the past, but rather, as Richard Kilbourne puts it,
"a kind of restatement of the essential principles of the law, its
various titles and articles serving at most merely as points of
departure for lengthy expositions of Spanish and Roman law."'74 No
less a contemporary observer than Edward Livingston sized up the
status of the Digest in precisely these terms by arguing to the
Louisiana Supreme Court in one case that the Digest had failed to
attain the status of the Code Napoleon because it had only clearly
repealed inconsistent provisions, not all prior law and custom.
7
"
What has not been assessed in most scholarship about the post-
Digest era, however, is whether and to what degree lawyers and
judges involved in these famous and not-so-famous cases, along with
the jurists responsible for drafting the 1825 Code, cast their
arguments and opinions precisely in terms of the dialectic between
legal certainty on one hand and uncertainty, or perhaps even
flexibility and equity, on the other. Several fascinating cases-the
post-Cottin, pre-Civil Code case of Marie v. Avart 's Heirs, 6 the 1828
case of Saul v. His Creditors,77 and the famous 1839 decision in
decision on question of how many witnesses are required for proof of extra-judicial
confession); Morse v. Williamson and Patton's Syndics, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 282,283-84
(La. 1814) (recognizing that provisions of Spanish law failing to allow clearly for
attorney's privilege for fees against estate of insolvent debtor are "virtually repealed
and abrogated" by 1806 Digest provisions which give privilege to law charges, or
"frais de justice;" for certain "tax fees"); Fitzgerald v. Phillips 4 Mart. (o.s.) 290,
293 (La. 1816) (recognizing that Digest repeals provision of Spanish law
prohibiting creditors from suing debtor who has turned over all his property when
amount of debtor's newly acquired property does not exceed amount necessary for
his support).
72. La. Civ. Code art. 3521 (Morgan ed., 1854).
73. 1828 La. Acts No. 160, § 25; see also 1828 La Acts No. 66.
74. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 69; see also id. at 75 (suggesting that Louisiana
Supreme Court approached the Digest "as a kind of 'Restatement of the Civil Law'
that still drew its sustenance from the uncodified law of the region"); id. at 93
(summarizing reasons for judicial attachment to Spanish law and resistance to
"'continental' legal system; that is, a post-French revolutionary one wherein the
legal principles espoused in a legislatively posited code are the sole guide for
determining legal disputes").
75. Durnford v. Gross, 7 Mart. (o.s.) 465, 474-75 (La. 1820).
76. 8 Mart. (o.s.) 512 (1820).
77. 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (1828).
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Reynolds v. Swain,7 8-along with the 1823 preliminary report to the
legislature made by Livingston, Moreau Lislet, and Derbigny on the
status of their efforts to prepare a new Civil Code,79 are useful places
to begin to make such an assessment.
1. Marie v. Avart's Heirs: Legal Certainty in Flux
Marie v. Avart's Heirs concerned the validity of a will by which
the testator, Erasmus R. Avart, instructed his executor to purchase a
mulatto slave named Marie, who was also his concubine, and their
natural child, Gaston, from their current owner, Nicholas Lauve, and
then to emancipate both Marie and Gaston."° The will also left the
usufruct and naked ownership of a house, a lot, and a sum of money
to Marie and Gaston respectively.8" Initially, the Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether Marie possessed the legal
capacity to sue someone other than her master, in this case the
executor, for her emancipation.82  After the Supreme Court
recognized that Marie enjoyed such a right because her suit was not
opposed by her acknowledged master,83 the intestate heirs of the
testator were allowed to assert and eventually prove to a jury that
Avart was insane at the time he wrote the will and thus the will was
unenforceable.' This factual finding occurred, however, only after
the trial court had rejected Marie's legal objection to the introduction
of evidence of Avart's alleged insanity. Her legal objection was
based on an 1808 Digest provision, derived from the Code Napoleon,
stating that "[a]fter the death of a person interdicted, the validity of
acts done by him or her cannot be contested, for cause of insanity,
unless the interdiction was pronounced or petitioned for previous to
the death of such person.""
78. 13 La. 193 (1839).
79. Preliminary Report of the Code Commissioners, February 13, 1823; 1
Louisiana Legal Archives, LXXXV (1937) (hereinafter Preliminary Report).
80. Marie v. Avart, 6 Mart (o.s.) 731 (La. 1819). This case has also been
studied by Judith Schafer whose reading of the complete case file discloses several
illuminating facts about the relationship of concubinage between Marie and Avart.
See Schafer, supra note 18, at 197-99.
81. Marie v. Avart Heirs, 8 Mart. (o.s.) at 514.
82. Marie v. Avart, 6 Mart. (o.s.) at 732.
83. Id. at 733. In fact, the master (Lauve) was willing to sell Marie and her son
for a "reasonable price." Id. at 731.
84. Marie, 8 Mart. (o.s.) at 512.
85. Id. at 512-13; see also Marie v. Avart's Heirs, 10 Mart. (o.s.) 25, 26-28
(La. 1821).
86. Digest of the Civil Laws Now In Force in the Territory of Orleans (1808)
(hereinafter Digest of 1808), Bk. I, Title IX, Ch. 1, art. 16, at 80 (Claitor's 1971).
See also Code Civil art. 504 (1804) ("Apres la mort d'un individu, les actes par lui
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Eventually, the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve the
complex problem of statutory interpretation growing out of Marie's
legal objection. On one hand, Marie's counsel, Christobal De Armas,
maintained that the Digest provision was intended to prohibit the
introduction of parole evidence of a deceased person's insanity
except in cases where an interdiction had been pronounced or
petitioned for prior to death and was thus a "legislative innovation"
that clearly contradicted the previously governing Spanish law in
force that always allowed wills to be challenged on the basis of
insanity.87 On the other hand, Etienne Mazureau, counsel for Avart's
heirs, pointed out that another provision of the Digest, also based on
the Code Napoleon, required generally that a donation inter vivos or
mortis causa must be made by a person of "sound mind.""8
Moreover, according to Mazureau, most French courts, with one
minor exception, interpreted the parallel provisions of the Code
Napoleon (Articles 504 and 901) in pari materia and prohibited
introduction of parole evidence of insanity only in cases concerning
ordinary acts of life (i.e., onerous alienations) and did not apply the
limitation to donations and testaments, which, he claimed, always
require a donor or testator to be of sound mind. 9
At the conclusion of his lengthy rebuttal argument in support of
Marie's effort to prohibit introduction of parole evidence of Avart's
alleged insanity, De Armas, seeming to paraphrase or borrow the
words of a French scholar, M. Cottel, decried what he saw as the
faits ne pourrount etre attaques pour cause de demence, qu'autant que son
interdiction aurait etre pronounce or provoque avant son deces; a mois que la
prevue de la demence ne resulte de l'acte meme qui est attaque"). As Justice Porter
eventually pointed out, the original French Digest provision may have mistranslated
the Code Napoleon provision by changing the subject of the article from "un
individu" (an individual) to "un interdit" (an interdicted person). Marie v. Avart's
Heirs, 10 Mart. (o.s.) at 26. See also Digest of 1808, Bk. I, Title IX, Ch. 1, art. 16,
at 81. As Justice Porter pointed out, the logic of the Digest provision left something
to be desired: "Now can there be any interdicted person whose interdiction was not
pronounced previous to the death of such person? Can anyone be interdicted after
his death?" Marie, 10 Mart. (o.s.) at 26. Even if the original Code Napoleon
version had been inserted into the Digest verbatim, however, the Digest article's
logic might not have been much clearer.
87. Marie, 8 Mart. (o.s.) at 515. De Armas also asserted another legal reason,
this one based on Spanish law, for objecting to the introduction of the evidence of
the testator's insanity-the possibility that the testator made the will during a "lucid
interval." Id. at 517-18. However, it would seem that De Armas would have had
to prove this period of lucidity through parole evidence, thus opening the door to
introduction of the same by Avart's heirs.
88. Marie, 8 Mart. (o.s.) at 567-68 (Etienne Mazureau's argument); see also
Digest of 1808, Bk. 3, Title II, Ch. 2, art. 5, at 208); see also Code Civil art. 901
(1804).
89. See Marie, 8 Mart. (o.s.) at 567-68 (Etienne Mazureau's argument), 515-
16 (De Armas' argument acknowledging this argument).
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tendency of interpreters of the code (presumably the Code Napoleon)
"of seeing in the code only new dispositions, and of thus detaching
them from our ancient jurisprudence, for the purpose of explaining
the code by new and particular considerations." 90 Such "an isolated
mode of proceeding," De Armas argued, "tends to destroy the
progress which our jurisprudence has already made" and lead to
"such a course of arbitrary decisions that ages will be requisite to
recover the elements of a sound, and above all, a constant and
uniform jurisprudence."' Strangely, here, the perceived threat of
"arbitrary decisions" was linked in De Armas' argument with a fear
that courts would try to detach new code provisions from ancient
jurisprudence-exactly the kind of interpretative practice that the
Supreme Court sought to limit in Cottin in any case in which the
Digest did not directly contradict the former Spanish law in force. 92
Thus, at the same time that he heralded the new Digest provision
restricting invalidation of juridical acts to those performed by
interdicted persons as an "innovation" from Spanish decisions
promoting will contests in many cases, he also plead for legal
certainty guaranteed by the continuity of prior jurisprudence. Not
only are De Armas' arguments about legal certainty
self-contradicting, but his rhetoric of legal certainty seems to mask
an internal confusion about what kind of legal order is preferable.
Far from reflecting a fixed notion about how best to interpret a civil
code, the concept of legal certainty seems to serve as an open-ended
rhetorical device that an ardent attorney like De Armas would try to
deploy to support any interpretative position he needed to take to
advance his client's interests.
Perhaps even more significant than the instability of the idea of
legal certainty in De Armas' arguments was Justice Martin's final
opinion for the Supreme Court upholding the jury finding that
invalidated the will and thus perpetuated Marie and Gaston's
enslavement. In that opinion, Justice Martin hardly acknowledged
De Armas' ambiguous pleas regarding certainty. Instead, after
briefly ridiculing the logical absurdities inherent in the Digest's poor
90. Id. at 592 (emphasis added). Here, De Armas seems to be referring
specifically to French jurists, including those of the French court of cassation,
whose interpretations of the relevant French articles he characterizes as having
constituted a "useless and dangerous subversion of a just, enlightened, and
reasonable jurisprudence, which has hitherto prevailed." Id. at 596.
91. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
92. See Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93, 94 (La. 1817) (holding that prior
Spanish laws in force "must be considered as untouched, whenever the alterations
and amendments, introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such parts
of those laws are only repealed, as are either contrary to, or incompatible with the
provisions of the [digest]").
1418 [Vol. 63
JOHN A. LOVETT
translation of the original Code Napoleon article,93 he confidently
read the Digest articles in pari materia, just as the French jurists and
courts did with the respective Code Napoleon articles, and
determined that the legislative intent behind the Digest was not to
impose an interdiction prerequisite for attacking donations on the
basis of insanity, but to make sanity "a sine qua non of this kind of
donation, which the donee, or the person claiming under him, may be
called on to establish."94 His reasoning seems entirely unconcerned
with determining the precise legislative source or doctrinal authority,
be it Spanish or French, for the rule he eventually derived, except to
admit that the dispute must be resolved in the context of the Digest,
which, because of its apparent contradiction of the Spanish law,
would provide "the only rule of conduct," even though, he added, the
court "may be aided by the labors of law writers, and by the decisions
of courts.""
In fact, Martin's deepest interest seems to lie in the social policy
he found to support the entire legislative framework-the policy of
preventing those surrounding a dying but delirious man from
procuring an apparent will that would defeat the rights of his
otherwise lawful intestate heirs.96 In this sense, Marie v. Avart's
Heirs typifies a different kind of legal reasoning altogether that is
beginning to emerge throughout antebellum America, a movement
away from thinking of the law as fixed doctrine to be used only for
the adjudication of a particular dispute but toward consideration of
legal rules from a functional or instrumental perspective.97 Thus, the
quest for certainty of legal result-whether flowing from reliance on
a continuous and uninterrupted stream ofpriorjurisprudence or based
on a positivistic and anti-historical civil code that breaks with the
past--can be seen giving way to judicial flexibility, if not to a kind
of teleological jurisprudence.
In the end, these complex permutations on the principle of legal
certainty in Marie v. Avart's Heirs produced two significant ironies.
First, the kind of pragmatic legal certainty that would have been
promoted had Marie prevailed-that is, the fixing of a relatively
strict, bright-line rule forbidding challenges to a testator's will based
on insanity in all cases except those involving prior interdiction-was
here ironically rejected in favor of a broad and more vaguely defined
preference for exposte adjudication to determine in any case whether
93. Marie, 10 Mart. (o.s.) at 26; see also supra note 86 (discussing translation
problems).
94. Marie, 10 Mart. (o.s.) at 26-28.
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 1-4
(1977).
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a testator possessed a sound mind, an interpretative rule that has
survived in Louisianajurisprudence and in Civil Code revisions more
or less untouched for almost two hundred years.9 Second, the
court's preference for a rule allowing more equitable discretion to
probe a testator's intent and capacity led to a result-Marie and
Gaston's continued enslavement-that probably frustrated Avart's
testamentary intentions and will disturb most twenty first century
readers' sense ofjustice.99
2. The Preliminary Report of 1823: Towards System, Order,
and Accessibility
Another revealing example of the ambiguous use of the concept
of legal certainty can be found in the 1823 preliminary report to the
Louisiana legislature prepared by the jurisconsults appointed by the
legislature to revise the 1808 Digest and prepare a new Civil Code,
Edward Livingston, Louis Moreau Lislet, and Pierre Derbigny.
Although this document has been called a "remarkable piece of
conservative thinking, considering that it was presented as a reform
of the existing legal order,""'0 the jurisconsults' report is marked by
contradictory notions about legal certainty and the proper legal order.
Toward the beginning of their report, the jurisconsults promise to
"keep a reverent eye on those principles, which have received the
sanction of time, and on the labors of the great Legislators, who have
98. See La. Civ. Code art. 1477 rev. cmt.(f) (2000) ("Cases involving
challenges to capacity are fact intensive."); Frederick W. Swaim, Jr. & Kathryn V.
Lorio, Successions and Donations, 10 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 10.4, at
246-52 (1995) (explicating "sound-mind" standard for challenges to testator's
capacity formerly found in Article 1475 of the 1870 Civil Code and the 1991
revision of this standard effected by current Article 1477 of the Civil Code); see
especially id. at 248 ("The question of mental capacity [under the old article], thus,
became a question of fact with great discretion placed in the trier of fact."), 251
(noting that new standard under Civil Code article 1477 "is even looser than the
previous one in Louisiana").
99. The moral discomfort one feels today is heightened by the Supreme Court's
rejection of De Armas' attempt to offer allegedly newly discovered evidence
tending to prove the testator's sanity, Marie, 8 Mart. (o.s.) at 513, because of
relatively technical pleading deficiencies. See Marie, 10 Mart. (o.s.) at 29. In
addition, it is noteworthy that the result in this case seems to deviate from the
relatively tolerant attitude of the Louisiana Supreme Court that Judith Schafer
observes in other cases involving the attempted emancipation of concubines in
antebellum Louisiana. Schafer, supra note 18, at 180-200. In particular, in a long
passage that apparently excerpted from part of the unpublished case files, Schafer
shows us that Justice Martin himself displayed some personal sympathy for Avart's
testamentary intent to benefit his concubine and natural children. Id. at 198 ("It is
evident, therefore, that Erasmus R. Avart, not only obeyed the dictates of nature,
but, also, acted under the authority of the law.").
100. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 110.
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preceded us," whose works-including "The Laws of the Partidas,
and other Statutes of Spain, the existing digest of our own Laws, the
abundant stores of the English Jurisprudence, the comprehensive
Codes of France"--they promise to harmonize by resort to oracles of
"eternal truth" and to "those inspirations of prophetic Legislation"
that inspired Roman jurists.'0 ' In other words, at the outset,
Livingston, Moreau Lislet, and Derbigny seemed to adopt the voice
of a natural law jurist, or at least a jurist perfectly comfortable with
the Louisiana Supreme Court's narrow and dismissive interpretation
of the Digest of 1808 in Cottin v. Cottin,10 2 a jurist who would find
legal certainty, like the authors of the 1806 Manifesto, primarily in
continuity of ancient jurisprudence and gradual judicial development
of the law.
Yet, at the same time, the jurisconsults also admitted that the
"principal object" for their legislative appointment was to "provide
a remedy for the existing evil, of being obliged in many [c]ases to
seek for our [f]aws in an undigested mass of ancient edicts and
Statutes, decisions imperfectly recorded, and the contradictory
opinions of Jurists."' 3 Here, then, it was the uncertainty provoked by
the sheer volume and breadth of possible legal sources that appeared
to trouble the legislators who charged Livingston, Moreau Lislet, and
Derbigny with the task of creating a new Civil Code'o4an
uncertainty magnified by the problem of those sources having been
expressed in "[languages not generally understood by the people. 105
Further, these three drafters, all of whom were involved in Cottin
(Derbigny as author, Moreau Lislet as defendant's counsel, and
Livingston as plaintiffs counsel), 0 6 seemed to lament the
incompleteness of the Digest, which they called "an advance towards
the establishment of system and order," and its imperfect repeal of
the preceding Spanish legal regime.' ° Their apparent desire for a
complete and more radical transformation of the private law emerged
101. Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at LXXXIX-XC.
102. 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93, 94 (La. 1817) (holding that the 1808 Digest was merely
"a digest of the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it was adopted;
that those laws must be considered as untouched, wherever the alterations and
amendments, introduced in the digest, do not reach them").
103. Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at LXXXVII.
104. As noted previously, this concern about the unwieldy growth of written
sources of law, particularly in the form of new volumes of case reports, was
common throughout the United States in this era. See Cook, supra note 6, at 49-50.
105. Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at LXXXVII.
106. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 110.
107. See Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at LXXXVIII ("But it [the Digest]
was necessarily imperfect: not purporting to be a Legislation on the whole body of
the Law; a reference to that which existed before, became inevitable, in all those
cases (and there were many) which it did not embrace.").
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even more clearly in their praise of the "Napoleon Code, that rich
[1]egacy which the expiring Republic gave to France and to the world
a system approaching nearer to perfection than any which
preceded it," whose perfection was directly attributable to the fact
that it was designed to "supersede [sic] all the other [lIaws of the
country; and be for future cases, the only rule of conduct."' '
Finally, despite several indications of a purportedly modest and
conservative ambition that would suggest an intent to preserve much
of the existing Spanish law in force as represented in the Digest or in
other unrepealed sources,"° the jurisconsults launched an inspired
rhetorical defense of their project that again combined practical
criticism of the uncertainty resulting from an excessively large and
unwieldy mass of sources with a defense of radical codification,
written law, and the bridling ofjudicial discretion that seems as if it
could have been lifted directly from the works of William Sampson'1 °
or Jeremy Bentham."' The following two excerpts illustrate this
double-edged movement in the report:
To determine what is the true meaning of the Law when it is
doubtful; to decide how it applies to facts when they are
legally ascertained is the proper office of the Judge-[t]he
exercise of his discretion is confined to these, which are
called Cases of Construction: in all others he has none, he is
but the organ for giving voice, and utterance, and effect, to
that which the Legislative branch has decreed. In cases
where there is no [l]aw, according to strict principles he can
neither pronounce nor expound, nor apply it. Governments
108. Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at LXXXIX. It is particularly striking,
as Mitchell Franklin noticed years ago, that the redactors here explicitly
acknowledged their admiration for the Code Napoleon in light of Moreau Lislet's
apparent failure to acknowledge that source in his notes on the de la Vergne copy
of the 1808 Digest where he focused primarily on Spanish sources. Franklin,
Important Document, supra note 16, at 36, 38.
109. Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at XC-XCI (promising not to "innovate
in any case where a change is not called for by some great inconvenience in the
existing [1]aw;" promising "no material change in the order and great divisions of
our Civil Code;" suggesting that the expanded Code would provide for as many
cases "as can be foreseen and rendering a reference to any other authority necessary
in as few cases as our utmost care can avoid").
110. See Cook, supra note 6, at 58-60, 106-08 (discussing Sampson's critique
of common law); Bloomfield, supra note 8, at 59-90 (reviewing same in context
of Sampson's entire career).
111. For a summary of Bentham's views on codification, see Cook, supra note
6, at 76-78. For a sample of Bentham's own writing on codification and related
topics, see Jeremy Bentharn, "Legislator ofthe World:" Writings on Codification,
Law, and Education (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998), in the series
The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (F. Rosen & P. Schofield gen. eds.).
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under which more is required from, or permitted to, the
Magistrate are vicious because they confound Legislative
power with Judicial duties, and permit their exercise in the
worst possible shape, by creating the rule, after the case has
arisen to which it is applied. This is a vice inherent in the
Jurisprudence of all nations governed wholly, or in part, as
England is by unwritten [f]aws, or such as can only be
collected from decisions ....
We have seen that in England this source, in cases where
there were neither precedent nor authority, was the undefined
and undefinable common [law; and that there the Judge drew
his own rule, sometimes with Lord Mansfield, from the pure
fountain of the Civil Code, sometimes from the turbid stream
of doubtful usage, often from no better source than his own
caprice. That in France, because the Great Code had no
provision on this subject, they were obliged to make out these
supplementary rules of decision, from the rubbish of ancient
ordinances, local customs and forgotten edicts; and to
introduce in all omitted cases, the confusion ofjurisprudence
from which it was the intent of the Code to relieve them. We
in the execution of our trust determined that we should not
perform it in the manner required of us; unless we relieved
your courts in every instance from the necessity of examining
into Spanish Statutes, ordinances and usages, Latin
Commentaries, the works of French and Italian Jurists, and
the heavy tomes of Dutch and Flemish annotations, before
they could decide the Law; and at last giving their opinions
under the mortifying doubt, whether in some book not now to
be found in the state, a direct authority might not hereafter be
discovered, which would shew [sic] their decision to be
illegal; unless we gave to your constituents a Code accessible
and intelligible to all; and unless we removed the oppression,
the reproach, the absurdity, of being governed by laws, of
which a complete collection has never been seen in the state,
written in languages which few, even of the advocates or
judges, understand, and so voluminous, so obscure, so
contradictory, that human intellect however enlarged, human
life however prolonged, would be insufficient to understand,
or even to peruse them."3
Another crucial symptom of the ambivalence displayed in the
preliminary report is the tension between (1) the call for "an express
112. Preliminary Report, supra note 79, at XCI (emphasis added).
113. Id. at XCII (emphasis added).
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repeal of all former laws and usages defining civil rights," (2) the
recommendation that in cases involving lacunae in the Code, judges
should be required to employ "the dictates of natural equity," and (3)
the advice that such gap-filling decisions "shall have no force as
precedents unless sanctioned by the legislative will" and instead should
be reported to the legislature. 14 In other words, "the remedy for the
evil of a confused and uncertain jurisprudence," the jurisconsults
suggested, would be strict devotion to the separation of legislative and
judicial powers "within their proper spheres of action." ' Although
this assertion of the principles of legislative supremacy may only
evidence a belief in separation of powers, not "any belief in the
absolute power of the legislature to posit a legal order at odds with
natural law-or the ancient laws, for that matter, to the extent that the
ancient laws best represented natural order,"'" 6 it does seem connected
to the promotion of the kind of legal certainty informed by a
philosophical aversion to uncontrolled judicial discretion.
In sum, whether the product of their labors, the 1825 Code,
surreptitiously deepened the French influence and lessened the
Spanish-Roman influence on the Civil Code, as Rodolfo Batiza and
Vernon Palmer suggest," 7 or actually represented a further restatement
of the existing Spanish laws that had never been repealed, as Richard
Kilboume maintains,"' it seems clear that the jurisconsults who
prepared that Code could not help but think of their task in terms of
legal certainty. And for them, legal certainty appears to have had
philosophical underpinnings that were closely aligned with a
preference for written, codified law that would be clearly accessible to
a broad swath of the population and would reduce, though not totally
eliminate, opportunities for the exercise ofjudicial discretion.
3. Saul v. His Creditors and Reynolds v. Swain: Preserving
Flexibility in an Increasingly Positivist Legal Structure
Another revealing example of the use of the concept of legal
certainty (and also of the emergence of the competing principle of
judicial flexibility) surfaces in the important and keenly fought case of
114. Id. at XCII-XCIII.
115. Id. at XCIII-XCIV.
116. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 112.
117. Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823, A
General Analytical Survey, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 8-9, 23-24 (1972) (demonstrating
enhanced French influence through redactors' heavy use of French doctrinal writers
as sources in preparation of 1823 Projet); Id. at 6-8 (demonstrating apparent
concealment of movement toward French sources in the 1825 Code); Palmer, supra
note 15, at 1068-69) (highlighting enhanced French influence on 1825 Code).
118. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 114-20.
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Saul v. His Creditors,"9 and specifically in the opinion authored by
Justice Alexander Porter. Porter's hostility to legislative efforts to
reduce Louisiana's law to legislatively posited codes has been well
documented ° and is manifested most famously by his anti-positivist
construction of Article 3521 in Cole's Widow v. His Executors,' in
which he defiantly refused to recognize the legislature's seemingly
transparent intent to sever once and for all Louisiana private law from
pre-codification Spanish law and to found it entirely on the Civil Code
and other legislative enactments.'22 Significantly, in his1828 opinion
in Cole's Widow, Porter also acknowledged his debt to the decision
one year earlier in Saul in which, according to Porter, key principles
were established which "facilitate[d]" the final determination in Cole 's
Widow.'
23
Saul v. His Creditors'2' concerned a simple but important legal
issue: whether property acquired by a man and wife while residing in
Louisiana during their marriage was subject to the community of
acquets and gains even though the man and wife were originally
married in another state that did not recognize the legal
community.' Given the large numbers of Americans migrating to
Louisiana from other states and territories during this period, this
119. 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (La. 1828). In the introductory portion of his opinion,
Justice Porter remarked on the high quality of the legal work in the case:
The different questions of law arising on these claims, have been
argued with an ability worthy of their importance. Some of these
questions... have been examined with so much care by the counsel,
and have received such additional light from the laborious investigation
bestowed on them, that they come upon our consideration with as much
freshness, as if this was the only time our attention had been drawn to
them.
Id. at 570.
120. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 134. However, when confronted with direct
and unmistakable evidence of recent legislation contradicting the prior Spanish law,
Porter was prepared, albeit reluctantly, to enforce the new, and typically French
inspired, legislation. Id. at 135-36 (discussing Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. (n.s.)
229, 231-32 (1827)).
121. 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41 (La. 1828).
122. Id. at 46 (limiting effect of Article 3521's repeal of prior law only to cases
"specifically provided for"); see also Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 136-37
(discussing same). Two other striking examples of his Cottin-like aversion to
treating the Digest as a break from the previously existing Spanish law and his
preference for the Spanish jurisprudence over French jurisprudence, even in a case
in which a Digest provision has a clearly parallel source in the Code Napoleon are
found in Ozanne v. Delile, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 21, 28-29 (1826), and Lacroix v. Cocquet,
5 Mart (n.s.) 527, 527-29 (1827).
123. 7 Mart. (n.s.) at 43 (citing Saul).
124. 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 569.
125. Id. at 571.
126. Between 1803 and 1810, the population of the Territory of Orleans swelled
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was an increasingly common problem that required significant
judicial attention. In this case, the creditors of a bankrupt husband,
a group including John Jacob Astor, contended that the property
acquired by the husband after the married couple moved to Louisiana
was his alone and not subject to any claims based on the community
of gains because the couple had been married in a non-community
property state (Virginia).' In opposition, the children of the
insolvent husband asserted privileged claims to one-half of the same
property acquired in Louisiana because (1) their mother had died in
1819 and (2) all of the property either one acquired in Louisiana, they
argued, was subject to the community of gains.128
From its outset, Justice Porter's opinion recognized the centrality
of the principle of legal certainty to the conflict facing the court. Up
until the moment this case reached his court, he explained, it was well
understood in Louisiana jurisprudence that when a husband and wife
who have been married elsewhere moved to Louisiana, all the
property either spouse acquired after their arrival in Louisiana was
part of the community and thus subject to equal division upon
dissolution of the marriage.129 When such a fundamental rule of
community property law has been "already settled by the decisions
of the tribunal of last resort in the state," Porter wrote, "the subject
ought not to be opened again, and that the most important interests
of society require, there should be a time when contested points of
jurisprudence may be considered as at rest."'3 In other words,
Porter opened by recognizing that legal certainty in its pragmatic
sense-the need for predictability of legal rules upon which persons
can order their juridical acts-was so important that it should cut off
further jurisprudential second guessing. In short, he seemed to be
making a classic utilitarian argument for the binding effect of
jurisprudence constante.
And yet, in his very next judicial breath, Porter revised this
position with the following exposition on the limits of the binding
effect of judicial precedent:
But these considerations are not in this case of sufficient
weight to preclude a reexamination ofthe principles on which
the doctrine already stated has been established. A sufficient
from 43,000 to 76,000, an increase of over 75% in seven years. Dargo, supra note
15, at 6. By 1820, Louisiana's population had increased to 153,000, and by 1830
it had reached 216,000. 1 Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to 1970, 28 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1975).
127. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 569-71.
128. Id. at 571.
129. Id. at 572. For discussion of the jurisprudence to which Porter seems to
refer here, see infra note 132.
130. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 572 (emphasis added).
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period has not elapsed to enable it to derive much authority
from the acquiescence of others. The decision of the court
cannot be supposed to have influenced parties entering into
the marriage contract, or greatly to have affected any
important interests in society. . . . We shall therefore,
proceed to the examination of the question as if the case was
now presented for the first time, and, we trust, without any
bias which might be supposed to exist in our minds from the
opinions we have already expressed.'13'
Thus, despite the primary importance of practical certainty to the
legal order, Porter implied that certainty was not the only value and,
indeed, in some cases---especially where the temporal proximity of
previous judicial decisions necessarily limited the extent to which
they have been relied upon 32 -other "considerations" may become
more important than certainty. What were those other considerations
then?
To understand the considerations Porter seems to have had in
mind, we must focus briefly on the relevant sources of law that Porter
had arrayed before him. The essential interpretative problem posed
by the case was created by a discrepancy between the 1808 Digest
and the 1825 Code and particularly by the under-inclusiveness of the
relevant Digest provision. The relevant Digest article provided only
for a community of acquets and gains on "every marriage contracted
within this territory,' 133 but did not address the disposition of
property in cases of marriage contracted elsewhere. The 1825 Code
reproduced this provision but added Article 2370 to address this
apparent gap in the law and to provide that "[a] marriage contracted
out of this State, between persons who afterwards come to live here,
is also subjected to the community of acquets, with respect to such
property as is acquired after their arrival.' 34 If the court had been
131. Id. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
132. The previous Louisiana judicial decisions to which Porter refers here may
be the decisions in Gales v. Davis' Heirs, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 645, 649 (La. 1817)
(holding that when a married couple emigrates from a country where marriage was
contracted into another country, property acquired in the new country is governed
by the law of that place), and Murphy v. Murphy, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 83, 84-85 (La.
1817) (recognizing Gales, but noting that when couple entered into express
marriage contract providing for community of gains wherever they go, change of
residence to non-community state does not terminate community). Porter
reconciles these decisions later in his opinion in Saul. See Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at
605 (noting presence of express contract in Murphy and absence in Gales).
133. Digest (1808), Bk. 3, Tit. 5, ch. 2, art. 63, at 336 ("Every marriage
contracted within this territory, superinduces of right, partnership or community of
acquets and gains."); Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 573-74.
134. La. Civ. Code art. 2370 (1825) (Morgan ed., 1853); Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at
573-74.
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willing to apply this article retroactively to the marriage at issue,
which had been dissolved by the wife's death in 1819, the case would
have admittedly been easily solved within the four comers of the new
article.'35 The problem, however, was that the court in this period
was generally unwilling to give retroactive effect to any legislative
enactment, be it the Digest or the 1825 Code, and this case was no
exception.3 6  Thus, the only applicable Louisiana legislative
provision was the under-inclusive Digest article whose limited focus
on marriages contracted within the state could be read, in the absence
of any other source of law, Porter admitted, according to the principle
of construction "inclusion unius, est exclusio alterius," to evidence
a legislative intent to exclude the community ofacquets and gains for
marriages contracted outside of Louisiana."'
The key legal datum that allowed Porter to avoid the conclusion
seemingly mandated by the "contrario sensu" reading he had just
acknowledged, however-and perhaps the catalyst for his lengthy
musings on certainty-was that in this case "there already exists
positive legislation [i.e., Spanish law] on the same subject matter,
providing for the very case which it [the argument contrario sensu]
is presumed [to exclude]." 3 ' Consequently, Porter reasoned:
The law [the Digest provision] must then be interpreted by a
well known rule ofjurisprudence, that an intention to repeal
laws can never be supposed; that subsequent statutes do not
abrogate former ones by containing different provisions on
the same subject; they must be contrary to produce such
effect. This rule, which is true in relation to all laws, is more
particularly applicable to our codes, which were only
intended to lay down general principles andprovidefor cases
of the most common occurrence. If then, the provisions in
our code cannot be considered to have repealed the former
law, no argument can be drawn from them as to the intention
of the legislature to do so, or their opinion on this subject.'39
With this deft restatement of the principles underlying Cottin and
similar decisions from this era, 4 ° Porter remarkably positioned the
135. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 574 ("Ifthe acquets and gains, in respect to which the
present suit exists, had been made under the dominion of the law last cited [the
1825 Code], there would be an end to any dispute about their distribution; but the
marriage of the insolvent and his wife was dissolved by the death of the latter,
before that law was enacted.").
136. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 131,135, 140 n.27 (discussing supreme court's
refusal to apply any legislative enactments retroactively).
137. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 574-75.
138. Id. at 575.
139. Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added).
140. See Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) at 94 (La. 1817) ("It must not be lost sight of, that
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court to apply in this 1827 decision the pre-Digest, positive Spanish
law dating from the thirteenth century (here found in the Fuero Real
and the Partidas) that was presumably still in force in Louisiana
because the case was not covered by the Digest and had arisen prior
to the enactment of the 1825 Code."" Strangely, then, a willingness
to question the primacy of legal certainty led Porter back to a
traditional, conservative position that embraced, just like the authors
of the Manifesto and Justice Derbigny in Cottin, the continuity of
ancient laws as the means of securing legal certainty.
One more complication still confronted Porter in Saul, however,
and led to an even more curious statement about legal certainty. The
relevant provisions of the Partidas and Fuero Real were not easily
reconcilable. The Partidas provision seemed to stand for the
proposition that the law of the place of marriage governed the
disposition of property acquired during the marriage, while the Fuero
Real provision implied that all property acquired during a marriage,
regardless of the geographic site of the marriage, falls into the
community. 42 As a result of this conflict, Porter had to turn for
guidance to the Spanish commentators who, he claimed, uniformly
interpreted these conflicting provisions to limit the effect of the
Partidas and expand the reach of the Fuero Real provision, thus
allowing the law or custom of the place of the marriage to apply only
to property acquired in the place where the marriage was contracted
and, conversely, requiring that property acquired elsewhere be
governed by the law of the place to which the spouses have
removed. 43 In short, the law of the place where the property was
acquired controlled. Consequently, according to Porter, the
children's privileged claims to their mother's one-half interest in the
property acquired by the father after he and his wife moved to
Louisiana were enforceable. 14
our civil code is a digest of the civil laws, which were in force in this country when
it was adopted; that those laws must be considered as untouched, wherever the
alterations and amendments, introduced in the digest, do not reach them and that
such parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary to, or incompatible
with the provisions of the code."); Lacroix v. Coquet, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 527, 528 (La.
1827) (Porter, J.) ("Subsequent laws do not repeal former ones, by containing
different provisions; they must be contrary."); Flower v. Griffith, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 89,
91-92 (La. 1827) (Porter, J.) (holding that 1825 Code had not repealed Digest
articles that were not expressly amended, modified or suppressed and thus creating
possibility that a kind of shadow code, consisting of unrepealed Digest provisions,
existed side by side with 1825 Code).
141. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 576.
142. Id. at 577-79 (quoting and discussing Partidas 4, tit. 11, ley 23, and Fuero
Real, Novissima Recop. lib. 10, tit. 4, ley 1.)
143. Id. at 580-81.
144. Id. at 608.
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In a remarkable passage defending the Spanish commentators'
equitable, non-literal interpretation of these Spanish laws and his
court's right to rely on them, Porter stated:
In every nation that has advanced afew steps beyond the first
organization of political society, and that has made any
progress in civilization, a more extensive and equally
important part of the rules which govern men, is derivedfrom
what is called, in certain countries, common law, and here
jurisprudence.
This jurisprudence, or common law, in some nations, is
found in the decrees of their courts; in others, it is furnished
by private individuals, eminent for their learning and
integrity, whose superior wisdom has enabled them to gain
the proud distinction of legislating, as it were, for their
country, and enforcing their legislation by the most noble of
all means:-that of reason alone .... No civilized nation has
been without such a system. None, it is believed, can do
without it; and every attempt to expel it, only causes it to
return with increased strength on those, who are so sanguine
as to think it may be dispensed with. Duponceau, on
Jurisdiction, 105.
Spain, who was among the first of the European nations
that reduced her laws into codes, and who carried that mode
of legislation farther any other people, early felt the necessity
of a jurisprudence, which would supply the defects, and
soften the asperities of her statutes. The opinions of her
jurisconsults, seem to have obtained an authority with her, of
which the history of no other country offers an example. 45
Although this passage was not central to the court's ultimate holding,
it illustrates a very telling and perhaps novel reinterpretation of the
concept of legal certainty.
Writing eerily like a twentieth century legal critic," Porter here
viewed judicial gap-filling and interpretation as a way of softening
145. Id. at 581-83 (emphasis added).
146. See Rose, supra note 2, at 603 (noting that: (i) we tend to call for crystals
when we are in a "rulemaking" mode, "when legislatures make prospective law for
an unknown future," (ii) when we later "stand before judges;" we want them to
make exceptions, (iii) judges, because of their ex-post positions, "lean ever so
slightly to mud;" and thus (iv) this judicial preference for post hoc adjustments
"will gradually place an accretion of mud rules over people's crystalline
arrangements"). Id. at 604 ("We are more likely to find that judicial solutions veer
towards mud rules, while it is legislatures that are more apt to join with private
parties as 'rulemakers' with a tilt towards crystal.").
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the "asperity"--the clarity and perhaps harshness-of a state's
positive law. The flexibility provided by creative jurisprudential
interpretation, whether that of judges or scholars, was seen as an
essential antidote to positivism, provided there had not been a
specific rejection of the jurisprudential interpretation by the
sovereign. 47 Although this passage in part typified the supreme
court's general hostility in this period toward legislative efforts to
limit its discretion to reach back to pre-codification sources and
indeed foreordained the court's continued resistance to such
legislative efforts at least through the end of the 1830's, 41 it is
equally striking that Porter couches this hostility in terms of the
dialectic between certainty and flexibility. His effort suggests that
these concepts, like the dialectic between positive law and reliance
on unwritten law and judicial discretion, were subject to manipulation
and that certainty was not always the preeminent legal value for
Louisiana judges in this period.
Later in his opinion in Saul, when Porter claimed that "the people
of Louisiana have the same right to have their cases decided by that
[Spanish] jurisprudence, as the subjects of Spain have, except so far
as the genius of our government, or our positive legislation has
changed it," he was not only signaling to the legislature his court's
attachment to Spanish law in particular, but also was sending a
message about the value of gradualist rule-softening jurisprudence
and doctrine in general, whether it be of Spanish or French origin.49
147. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 584.
148. The generally recognized final example of such resistance, after which the
Court's insistence upon its ability to apply pre-codification Spanish law presumably
waned, is Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839), discussed in Kilbourne, supra note
9, at 162--64, and Fernandez, supra note 19, at 81-88. Some scholars, however,
have pointed to even later examples of such hostility and disdain for the
legislature's civil codes. See Schafer, supra note 18, at 19 (discussing Foley and
Townsend v. Bourg, 10 La. Ann. 129, 129 (1855) (referring to Civil Code of 1825
as "this lose amended codification")).
149. Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 608. Porter's regard for the value of doctrinal work
is clearly not limited to commentators on Spanish law, for much of the rest of his
opinion in Saul is devoted to a detailed and lengthy elaboration of Dutch and French
writers' views on the doctrine of real and personal statutes and on the theory of
conflicts of laws. Id. at 589-607. Similarly, in the more famous case of Cole's
Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41 (La. 1828), although Porter asserts the
court's right to interpret Louisiana's "former law" to the extent it has not been
repealed by the enactment of new positive legislation specifically providing for the
case at issue, id. at 75, his actual consideration of this "former law" was informed by
the "ancient customs of France" as much as "the rule in Spain," and he cites Pothier
along with the Febrero to support the court's ultimate holding that a voluntary
separation between husband and wife has no effect on the operation of Louisiana's
community property law on property found in Louisiana. Id. at 78-80. Thus, based
at least on these seminal Porter opinions, this writer would mildly disagree with
Kilbourne's assertion that the Supreme Court employed French commentaries in the
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Thus, when Richard Kilbourne observes that the Supreme Court in
this period "saw itself as the co-equal of the legislature in the process
of illuminating the sources of law," that is, saw itself as not being
"restricted to reasoning deductively from legislative enactments" but
"free to reason inductively toward general principles from the body
of specific provisions that constituted Louisiana's common law,"'"
he can also be understood as describing the court's predilection to
preserve a kind of judicial flexibility, an ability to fashion remedies
that might appear to have been plucked from an ancient and mist-
shrouded jurisprudential past, rather than restrict itself to the latest
clear statement of French inspired positive law.
Finally, as important as Justice Porter's decision in Saul was for
the Supreme Court one year later in Cole's Widow when it faced
another closely related community property and conflicts of law
issue," his overt challenge to the supremacy and sufficiency of
positive law in 1827 may have been even more significant to the
extent it motivated the legislature to adopt the famous repealing acts
of 1828 that specifically sought to abrogate both the Digest and all
the ancient civil law previously in force."' And yet even though the
Louisiana Supreme Court clearly recognized that the legislature
intended for the repealing acts to accomplish a complete repeal of all
interpretation of the Digest "only in a limited and rather incidental sort of way."
Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 150. Porter, it must be acknowledged, could also display
a lack of concern for doctrinal work of any national origin when his court's "reason
and common sense" led it to reach a conclusion different from "the doctrine of any
jurist, ancient or modem." Daquin v. Coiron, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 608, 616 (La. 1830).
150. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 155.
151. At the conclusion of this exhaustive study of the doctrine of real and personal
statutes in Saul, see supra note 149, Porter reached the conclusion that "the state and
condition of both husband and wife are fixed by the marriage, in relation to every
thing butproperty, independent of this law; and as it regulates property alone, it is not
a personal statute." Saul, 5 Mart. (n.s.) at 608 (citing Boullenois, Trait6 des statuts).
It is this holding that Porter relied upon one year later to help resolve the narrow legal
issue in Cole's Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 71 (La. 1828), of whether
Louisiana's comnmunity property law applied to property acquired by a husband while
he was residing in Louisiana during the marriage, even though the marriage was
contracted in New York and the wife never resided in Louisiana. In Cole's Widow,
Porter explained that in Saul v. His Creditors, the court had "determined that the law,
or to adopt the language of the jurisprudence of the continent of Europe, the statute,
which regulated the rights of husband and wife, was real, not personal; that it
regulated things, and subjected them to the laws of the country within which they
were found." Id. at 73-74. Consequently, any property located in Louisiana
acquired by married persons would "on the dissolution of the marriage, be
distributed according to the laws of Louisiana, no matter where the parties reside
.... " Id. at 74.
152. Kilbourne, supra note 9, at 140-41, 150, 158. See also 1828 La. Acts No.
160, § 25; 1828 La Acts No. 66.
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Spanish law,'53 it continued to display its reluctance to abandon the
judicial flexibility that its previous habit of delving into ancient
Spanish civil law had provided.
Thus, in 1839 in Reynolds v. Swain, 54 when the Louisiana
Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Martin declared that the
effect of both Article 3521 of the 1825 Code and the 1828 repealing
acts had only been to repeal "positive, written or statute laws" of
Rome, Spain, France, and Louisiana and not principles established
by prior judicial precedent,15 the Court may have been seeking to do
more than just preserve its ability to use its own pre-1825
jurisprudence to the extent those decisions were based on principles
of Spanish or Roman law. As always, a brief consideration of the
factual context in which Reynolds unfolded is suggestive. Recall
that the case arose because Reynolds had leased to Swain and his
partners a prime piece of commercial real estate in New Orleans
under a verbal one year lease with the rent due monthly. The
defendants occupied the premises for two months operating as
apothecaries and then abandoned the premises without cause and
without having paid any rent. When Reynolds sued, the district
court gave him a judgment for the entire amount of rent due under
the lease and a privilege on the lessee's property up to the amount
of the rent that had already come due.
56
On appeal, the defendants' counsel, Tom Slidell, later a Justice
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 57 ingeniously argued that Reynolds
was not entitled to ajudgment on the full year's rent as it had not yet
become due, primarily because the rule of law which held to the
contrary-allowing a lessor to sue immediately upon a lessee's
abandonment of the premises for the full amount due on a lease with
a definite term-was sustained by a 1824 Louisiana Supreme Court
decision which was "founded on an express provision of Roman civil
law, which has long since been repealed in this State."'5 8 In other
words, Slidell was arguing that Article 3521 of the 1825 Code and
153. See Louisiana Bank v. Kenner's Succession, 1 La. 384, 394 (1830) ("the
laws of Spain have been considered as the laws of this State in relation to civil suits,
until their entire abrogation in 1828 by an act of our legislature"); Dixon v. Dixon,
4 La. 188, 190 (1832) (noting inapplicability of Spanish laws to same factual
scenario presented in Cole's Widow because such laws "were repealed previous to
the [1931] death of the husband"); Testamentary Executor of Lewis v. Casenave,
6 La. 437, 441-42 (1834) (noting "tremendously sweeping" effect of 1828
repealing act and its repeal of Spanish law).
154. 13 La. 193 (1839).
155. Id. at 198.
156. Id. at 194-95.
157. Fernandez, supra note 19, at 98.
158. Reynolds, 13 La. at 195 (citing Christy v. Cazanave, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 451 (La.
1824)).
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the 1828 repealing act had stripped a lessor like Reynolds of the
practical right to sue for the full rent due under a definite term lease
even though the lessee had already abandoned the premises and
demonstrated no intention of paying his rent. This practical remedy
of the lessor to an immediate remedy for the full amount due under
the terms of the lease had simply evaporated, according to Slidell,
because it was based on a pre-1825 case grounded on Roman law
principles. Given this factual scenario and the plainly impractical
gap in the law that a strict interpretation of the repealing act would
have entailed (requiring a lessor like Reynolds to wait until the entire
lease term expires to liquidate a claim for back rent or damages), it
is not surprising that the court in Reynolds v. Swain chose to preserve
its ability to fashion a pragmatic and flexible judicial remedy to what
would have been an unprovided for factual situation.'59 In short,
certainty, or least that kind of certainty centered on a positivistic faith
in written law, here had to take a back seat to the pragmatic certainty
that the exercise ofjudicial discretion could afford.
II. ARTICLE 466 AND COMPONENT PARTS OF IMMOVABLES:
DEBATING THE DAWN OF AN "ERA OF UNCERTAINTY"
With an appreciation for the complexity and ambiguity ofjurists'
and legislators' views about legal certainty during the struggles
concerning codification and authoritative sources of law in early
nineteenth century Louisiana, it would be worthwhile to trace these
same themes through the rest of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth century. A particularly important time period to investigate
would be the so-called "civilian renaissance," which began in the late
1930's with academic debates as to whether Louisiana's civil law
tradition was still discernable,"t° and which culminated in the 1970's
with a flourishing of scholarly writing and judicial opinions that self-
consciously sought to vitalize the civil law tradition.16 1 In addition,
159. See Fernandez, supra note 19, at 87 (arguing that Martin's holding in
Reynolds v. Swain "ensured that the Anglo-American judicial style Louisiana had
adopted in the territorial period would continue to define the role of the judiciary
for the rest of the century").
160. See Gordon Ireland, Louisiana Legal System Reappraised, 11 Tul. L. Rev.
585, 590-96 (1937) (arguing that Louisiana had become a common law state);
Leonard Greenburg, Must Louisiana Resign to the Common Law?, 11 Tul. L. Rev.
598, 598 (1937) (agreeing with Ireland); Harriet S. Daggett, Joseph Dainow, Paul
M. Hebert, & Henry G. McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brieffor the Civil
Law of Louisiana, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 12, 13 (1937) (seeking to refute Ireland).
161. See generally Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance ofthe Civilian Tradition in
Louisiana, in The Role of Judicial Decisions in Civil Law and in Mixed
Jurisdictions 38 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974); Mack E. Barhara, Methodology of the
CivilLaw in Louisiana, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 474 (1976); Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the
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studies of legislation and decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in specific areas of private law might well reveal further tensions and
ambiguity regarding legal certainty. Several subject areas
particularly ripe for examination include legislation and cases
addressing partition of community property rights in pension plans,"I
servitudes of passage to public roads,' and exceptions to
Louisiana's "pure-race" public records doctrine for assuring title to
immovable property.'" What might emerge from such a study,
Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: the Louisiana Experience, in The Role of Judicial
Decisions in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions 23 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974)
[hereinafter Tate, Role of the Judge]; Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in
Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673 (1970). But see also Kenneth M. Murchison, The
Judicial Revival of Louisiana's Civilian Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the
American Influence, 49 La. L. Rev. 1, 32-34 (1989) (arguing that the ultimate
flowering of the civilian renaissance in the 1970s owed as much to broad
developments in American legal thought in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly
American legal realism, as it did to a rediscovery of pure civilian traditions).
162. See T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834,844-46 (La. 1975)
(on rehearing 1976) (holding that pension benefits are a form of community
property because they are "the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both
husband and wife"); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 921 (La. 1978) (expanding and
building on T.L. James to make clear that a spouse's interest in participant spouse's
pension benefits includes "any right to receive proceeds attributable to such
employment during the community"); La. R.S. 9:2801 (1997) (providing each
spouse with "property of an equal net value" and granting courts broad equitable
discretion in partitioning of community assets); Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118,
123 (La. 1991) (emphasizing that the partition of community property interests in
pension plans should be guided by equitable principles derived not just from
community property articles in the Civil Code but also from equitable principles
expressed in other jurisdictions). For a useful and insightful study of the Supreme
Court's application of the basic principles of Louisiana community property law to
solve problems associated with pension benefits, see Dian Tooley Arrubarrena,
Applying Louisiana's Community Property Principles to Pensions, 33 Loy. L. Rev.
241 (1987).
163. See, e.g., Rockholt v. Keaty, 237 So. 2d. 663,666-68 (1970) (citing Planiol
and developments in French law to demonstrate that French law has opted for
particularized decision making, rather than strict, black letter rule, to determine
entitlement to legal servitude of passage to public road, and considering
contemporary social needs in making same determination under Louisiana law).
164. Compare 1 Peter S. Title, Louisiana Real Estate Transactions, § 8.1 (2ded.
2002) ("all sales, contracts, judgments and other instruments in writing affecting
immovable property which are not recorded are utterly null and void except
between the parties"); La. R.S. 9:2756. (1991) (same); Title, supra, § 8.3
(explaining that a third person should not be bound or barred by unrecorded claims
against property acquired by purchase, even when that third person acquires actual
knowledge of the interest outside the public records); McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So.
100, 105 (1909) (same) with Title, supra, § 8.16-8.18 and 8:21-8.26 (outlining
exceptions to Louisiana's public records doctrine applicable to persons who are (1)
universal successors to the parties of an unrecorded instrument, (2) spouses in
community, (3) parties by separate instruments, (4) holders of tort claims, and (5)
persons in bad faith or who did not give value). Compare Jackson v. D'Aubin, 338
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which this writer hopes to undertake in a future article but whose
length precludes inclusion here, is an understandin of the degree to
which "new cycles of certainty and uncertainty'"16 are occurring in
modem Louisiana scholarship and property law jurisprudence.
Yet before concluding this article it is worth examining, if only
briefly, at least one recent legal dispute that reveals how some of the
same conflicts about legal certainty that were generated by the crisis
of 1806 and in early Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the 1808
Digest and the 1825 Civil Code are still with us. This example of
contemporary conflict about the nature of legal certainty emerges
from the recent debate over the proper method of interpreting Article
466 of the Civil Code and, specifically, how to determine, in the
absence of contractual agreement or a relevant juridical act, whether
movable objects attached to a building or other construction are
"permanently attached" to the building or construction and thus can
be considered "its component parts.' 6
Although the "component part" classification scheme presented
by Article 466 might seem to be applicable in only narrowly confined
legal situations, it actually serves as a key building block in the Civil
Code's property law structure. Under Article 462 of the Civil Code
"[t]racts of land, with their component parts, are immovables."'i
Under Article 463, "[b]uildings, other constructions permanently
attached to the ground," along with standing timber, unharvested
crops and ungathered fruits, are all considered "component parts of
a tract of land when they belong to the owner of the ground."'16 As
a result, objects that might otherwise be considered movable if not
attached to a building or other construction can be effectively
immobilized if they are determined to be a component part of a
building or other construction permanently attached to the ground.
So. 2d 575, 580 (La. 1976) (holding that a co-trustee's interest in a testamentary
trust in immovable property could be effective as to third persons because it was
created by operation of law, despite the non-recordation of the trust instrument)
with Camel v. Waller, 526 So. 2d 1086, 1094 (La. 1988) (declining to recognize
effectiveness of pre-1980 community property interest in immovable property
acquired by a wife by operation of law when wife failed to record and cement
effectiveness of judgment of separation of bed and board that was granted by a
court to prevent husband from conveying that interest). See also Rose, supra note
2, at 385-90 (outlining the oscillation between crystal and mud rules, certainty and
uncertainty, affecting land recording systems in common law jurisdictions).
165. Rose, supra note 2, at 586.
166. La. Civ. Code art. 466 (1980). For a detailed study of this entire dispute
in its full historical context, see John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The
Ambiguous Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision
Jurisprudence as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 Loy. L. Rev. 615
(2002).
167. La. Civ. Code art. 462 (1980) (emphasis added).
168. La. Civ. Code art. 463 (1980).
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Objects that have been subject to this "component part"
immobilization include light fixtures and carpeting installed in a
home, 69 tile flooring, ceiling fans, and burglar alarms installed in a
condominium,170 a stadium scoreboard system,' 7' individual heating
and air-conditioner units installed in motel rooms,17 and, most
famously, expensive chandeliers installed in a mansion-like home. 
7
Perhaps the most common application of the component part
classification occurs in the basic real estate conveyance situation and
under the general rules of accession. For instance, the Civil Code
guarantees that the transfer or encumbrance of an immovable will, in
the absence of a contrary agreement or a previously recorded security
interest, include its "component parts.' 74  Similarly, under the
accession articles, otherwise movable objects permanently attached
to a building or other construction so as to become "component
parts" will be considered to be owned by the owner of that
immovable in the absence of a contractual agreement to the
contrary. 17 Other more specific accession rights concerning objects
attached to an immovable with the consent of the immovable's owner
also depend on classification of objects as "component parts of a
building or other construction" under Article 466.176 Finally, even some
169. Am. Bank& Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052, 1054-55 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1988).
170. Berot v. Norcondo P'ship, 544 So. 2d 508, 510-11 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1989).
171. In re Chase Manhattan Leasing Corp., 626 So. 2d 433, 434 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1993).
172. Hyman v. Ross, 643 So. 2d 256, 258-61 (La. App. 2d Cir. 9/19/94).
173. Equibank v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 749 F.2d 1176, 1180
(5th Cir. 1985).
174. La. Civ. Code art. 469 (1980). Under revised Chapter 9 of Louisiana's
Commercial Laws, the term "fixtures" refers to "goods, other than consumer goods
and manufactured homes, that after placement on or incorporation in an immovable
have become a component part of such immovable as provided in Civil Code
articles 463, 465 and 466." La. R.S. 10:9-102(41) (2002). Security interests in
movables that will become "fixtures" under this definition-that will become
component parts-preserve their effectiveness and ranking over the conflicting
interests of real estate owners or real estate mortgages in certain circumstances. See
generally Title, supra note 164, § 1.21-1.31; La. R.S.10:9-101 et seq. (2002); La.
R.S. 10:9-334 (2002).
175. See La. Civ. Code art. 493.1 (2003) ("Things incorporated in or attached
to an immovable, so as to become its component parts under Articles 465 and 466
belong to the owner of the immovable."). Under the Civil Code, however,
buildings and other constructions permanently may be owned by someone other
than the owner of the ground and thus can be considered separate immovables. See
La. Civ. Code arts. 464 & 491 (2003). "Nevertheless, they are presumed to belong
to the owner of the ground, unless separate ownership is evidenced by an
instrument filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
immovable is located." La. Civ. Code art. 491 (2003).
176. For example, if an object classified as a component part under Article 466 is
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provisions located outside of Book II of the Civil Code incorporate the
component part classification found in Article 466. For example, certain
accession articles based in Title VI, Book III, the matrimonial regimes
section of the Civil Code, give rise to special reimbursement claims
among former spouses with respect to component parts.
177
In short, the analytical framework provided by Article 466 is a
powerful interpretative instrument. It can be used to classify an object
as a movable or an immovable in a wide variety of legal contexts, from
the common place and predictable-ownership claims between
disputing vendors and purchasers ofimmovables, and the determination
of whether objects are subject to seizure and the respective priority of
competing creditors' liens' 78-to the less predicable and even novel
case that extends well beyond the strict confines of the Civil Code-the
applicability of certain kinds of taxes,171 imposition of fines for
environmental contamination, 8 ' the imposition of tort liability for
personal injuries based on ownership of underlying immovables,' and
insurance and property damage claims related to the destruction of
underlying immovables.'82
Before the revision of Title I of Book II of the Civil Code in
1978, the classification of otherwise movable objects as immovables
was addressed by Articles 467, 468, and 469 of the 1870 Civil
Code, 183 articles whose lineage was directly traceable to the 1808
Digest and Articles 523, 524, and 525 of the Code Napoleon,
provisions still in force in France today.1 84 The articles of the 1870
attached to an immovable belonging to another with the consent of that immovable's
owner, then, in the absence of some other contractual arrangement, the Civil Code
permits the original owner of the attached object to remove the object subject to his
obligation to restore the property to its original condition. La. Civ. Code art. 495
(2003). If the owner of the attached component part does not elect to remove it, the
owner of the immovable is granted various rights, including the right to compel the
separate owner of the component part to remove the thing at his expense or to keep
the component part by indemnifying the original owner of the component part. Id.
177. See La. Civ. Code art. 2367.1, 2367.2 (2003).
178. Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1177-79; Hyman, 643 So. 2d at 257-61; Am. Bank,
527 So. 2d at 1053-55.
179. Showboat Star P'ship v. Slaughter, 789 So. 2d 554, 558-61 (La. 2001).
180. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 826 F.2d 361,364-69
(5th Cir. 1987).
181. Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 916-18 (5th Cir. 1997).
182. Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169, 178-83
(5th Cir. 1999); In re Exxon Coker Fire, 108 F. Supp.2d 628, 631-38 (M.D. La.
2000); Exxon Corp. v. Foster-Wheeler Corp., 805 So. 2d 432, 435-38 (La. App.
1stCir. 12/28/01).
183. La. Civ. Code arts. 467-469 (West comp. ed. 1972) (1870).
184. La. Civ. Code arts. 467-469 (West comp. ed. 1972) (1870) (historical
notes); Digest of 1808, Bk. 2, tit. 1, ch. II, arts. 18, 20, and 21, at 98-99; Code Civil
arts. 523-25 (101 ed. Dalloz 2002); Batiza, supra note 17, at 63 (classifying Code
Napoleon sources of relevant 1808 Digest articles as verbatim or almost verbatim
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Civil Code and the Code Napoleon addressed this classification
problem through the categories of immovables by destination and
immovables by nature. As this author and others have tried to show,
the jurisprudence interpreting these old articles and the entire
classification architecture relying on the distinction between
immovables by destination and immovables by nature was, to put it
mildly, complex and confusing." 5 Because of the confusion and
uncertainty inherent in the old jurisprudence, as well as the general
obsolescence of the old categories in light of contemporary reality,
the 1978 revision suppressed altogether the concepts of immovables
by destination and immovables by nature and replaced them with the
simpler categories of corporeal immovables and incorporeal
immovables.' 6
At the same time, the 1978 revision also addressed the
classification of movable objects attached to immovables such as
buildings and other constructions permanently attached to the ground
through two new articles, Articles 465 and 466. Article 465, which
classifies as component parts "things incorporated into a tract of land,
a building, or other construction, so as to become an integral part of
it, such as building materials,"' 87 has provoked hardly any doctrinal
or jurisprudential controversy. New Article 466 is another story.
The text of revised Article 466 literally provides:
Things permanently attached to a building or other
construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or
other installations, are its component parts.
Things are considered permanently attached if they
cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves
or to the immovable to which they are attached.'
On its face, this new article seems to simplify dramatically-and thus
render more certain-the legal immobilization of movables attached
to buildings or other constructions. Rather than requiring courts to
consider a myriad of often antiquated factors that were implicated
under the old articles and theirjurisprudential gloss,189 the new article
sources).
185. Lovett, supra note 166, at 653-60; A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables,
Component Parts, Societal Expectations and the Forehead of Zeus, 60 La. L. Rev.
1379, 1382-85 (2000); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22 La. L. Rev. 517, 525-28, 530-42 (1962).
186. Expose des Motifs, 3 La. Civ. Code arts. 3,10-12 (1980).
187. La. Civ. Code art. 465 (1980).
188. La. Civ. Code art. 466 (1980).
189. These factors implicated under the old articles and jurisprudence included:
whether a movable was attached to a building for the "use and convenience of the
building" (former Article 467); whether a movable was placed on a tract of land for
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imposes a singular and lapidary test in its second paragraph: "Things
are considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed
without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to
which they are attached."' 90 Although the term "substantial damage"
is arguably capable of affording some necessary room for judicial
contextualizing about how much absolute or relative damage is
necessary to transform the legal status of an object from movable to
component part,19' the overall thrust of the article seems to have been
to provide a simple, bright-line rule that would produce predictable
and consistent results' 92-the very essence of the functional sense of
legal certainty. After all, it would seem that most individuals could
simply observe with their own senses (and courts could determine
through fairly straightforward types of evidence and testimony)
whether a particular object could be removed from a building or other
construction without causing substantial damage to itself or to the
building or construction to which it was attached.
In addition, and just as importantly, it would seem that the risk of
potentially harsh results that could follow such an apparently
"crystalline"' 93 rule could always be mitigated or softened byparties'
"its service and improvement" (former Article 468, first paragraph); whether a
movable was "permanently attached to the tenement or to the building" (former
Article 468, second paragraph); and whether an owner had "attached to his
tenement or building forever" a movable by having "affixed [it] with plaster or
mortar or such," so that it could not be removed without breaking or injuring the
movable or the thing to which it was attached (former Article 469). See Lovett,
supra note 166, at 653-60; Yiannopoulos, Zeus, supra note 185, at 1382-85;
Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables, supra note 185, at 525-28, 530-42.
190. La. Civ. Code art. 466 (1980).
191. See Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indent Co., 179 F.3d 169, 183
n.37 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing how some "elasticity in art. 466's bright-line test
for permanence of attachment lies in adjective 'substantial' which modifies
'damage,"' and how this provides for some "garden-variety contextual judging").
192. See Symeon Symeonides, Property, Developments in the Law, 46 La. L.
Rev. 655, 687 (1986) (admitting that a "literal reading of the article strongly
suggests that its two paragraphs are closely interdependent, and that the second
paragraph is but a guide for applying the first paragraph, and more particularly for
defining the meaning ofthe phrase 'permanently attached"'); AnyAllums, Prytania
Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co., How a Small Hotel Made a Big
Difference in the Component Part Concept, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1543, 1552 (2000)(acknowledging that on "on its face Article 466 creates a 'bright line permanent
attachment test'); Taylor S. Carroll, Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star
Indemnity Company: A Misapplication of Civil Code Article 466, 60 La. L. Rev.
947, 947 (2000) ("Read literally, the second paragraph of Article 466 requires that
in order for a movable to be considered permanently attached, removal would have
to cause substantial damage to either the movable or the immovable to which it is
attached.").
193. Rose, supra note 2, at 577-78. The scenario of a residence being literally
and legally stripped of every object whose removal does not cause substantial
1440 [Vol. 63
JOHNA. LOVETT
private ex ante arrangements providing for different classifications,
ownership rights, and other rights affecting objects in which they
have interests.'94 Indeed, the drafters of the revised Civil Code seem
to have specifically anticipated that there might even be instances in
which one party would like to effect a unilateral change in
classification of an otherwise movable object that could not be
predictably classified as a component part under Article 466. They
did so by providing a mechanism under new Article 467 that allows
owners of non-residential immovable property to file declarations of
immobilization which effectively convert otherwise movable objects
to component parts.' 95 Conversely, Article 468 also provides legal
recognition of the possibility of deimobilizing a component part into
a movable either based on inevitable damage or deterioration to the
object or affirmative acts of an owner. 9 6 In short, certainty seems to
have been the legislative goal of the revision. Parties, it might
reasonably be assumed, could be expected to live with the predictable
results of Article 466 unless they had specifically contracted for a
different classification between themselves or filed declarations of
immobilization or deimobilization under Articles 467 and 468.
damage to the home or the object-for instance, shutters, doors, light fixtures, to
name but a few-seems to have caused special alarm to some critics of a plain
reading of the bright line rule found in Article 466. See Allums, supra note 192, at
1555 (worried about "gutters, shutters, ceiling fans, ad infinitum"); Taylor, supra
note 192, at 947-48, 955, 964 (expressing concern about ordinary purchasers and
doors, water heaters, and light fixtures).
194. See Title, supra note 164, § 1.13, at 1-8 (suggesting that common place
disputes betweenbuyers and sellers in real estate transactions regarding component
part status should be avoided by "delineat[ing] specifically in the purchase
agreement the particular items attached to or located on the real estate... that will,
or will not, be transferred in the sale"); Rose supra note 2, at 577-80, 582-83
(describing private parties efforts to establish "crystalline" waivers of warranties
in real estate transfers in response to evolution of legal rules on warranty in
direction of muddiness); id. at 584 (same for private parties attempting to "bargain
their way out of uncertainties" in area of mortgage defaults). Indeed, Lee Hargrave
suggested years ago that expectations and actual practices were different in
residential as opposed to commercial building situations and that component part
classification probably needed to develop further to reflect those social differences.
Lee Hargrave, Property, Developments in the Law, 50 La. L. Rev. 353,362 (1989).
195. See La. Civ. Code art. 467 (2003). In City of New Orleans v. Baumer
Foods, 532 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. 1988), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
all four requirements for immobilization under Article 467 must be satisfied before
immobilization will be declared effective. As at least one critic has noted, however,
this holding produced practical problems-especially parties' inability to rely solely
on a recorded declaration of immobilization. Hargrave, supra note 194, at 360-61.
196. See La. Civ. Code art. 468 (2003) (providing for deimobilization when
component parts are "so damaged or deteriorated they can no longer serve the use
of lands or buildings," when an owner transfers ownership by "act translative of
ownership and delivery to acquirers in good faith," or by detachment and removal
in the absence of third party rights).
14412003]
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
During the first few years after the 1978 revision of Title I of
Book 1[ of the Civil Code, it seems as if the intended simplification
of the Civil Code's component part classification scheme was
having its intended effect. Courts began interpreting Article 466 as
if it had effected a clear break from the prior articles andjurisprudence and focused on the simplified substantial damage test
found in the article's second paragraph. 97 However, within a half
a decade, the situation changed dramatically and courts and doctrinal
writers began to interpret Article 466's seemingly "crystalline" rule
for the classification of component parts in a more complex way that
afforded courts more interpretative leeway and created the
opportunity for the exercise of substantial judicial flexibility.
In the seminal case of Equibank v. United States Internal
Revenue Service,198 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, aided by the testimony of a leading property law scholar,
A.N. Yiannopoulos, interpreted Article 466 as having created two,
essentially disjunctive and separate categories of component parts.
The first category consists, according to the court as it understood
Professor Yiannopoulos, of items that literally "fit within one of the
categories listed in the first paragraph of the article" (i.e.,
"plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations") and
which are thus considered component parts "as a matter of law."' 99
The second category consists of items not covered by the article's
first paragraph but which become "component parts" through the
objectively determined substantial damage test provided in the
article's second paragraph.200 Further, in a key passage in its opinion
which followed a detailed review of prior jurisprudence and the
Expose des Motifs for the 1978 revision to Book II, the Equibank
court concluded that "the views of the public on which items are
ordinarily regarded as part of a building must be considered in
197. See Nat'l Co. v. Bridgewater, 398 So. 2d 29, 33 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981)
(holding that cotton press was component part because it would be substantially
damaged upon removal from immovable to which it was attached); Simmons v.
Board of Comm'rs for Port ofNew Orleans, 442 So. 2d 836, 839 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1983) (holding that fence was not a component part of wharf to which it was
attached because removal did not cause substantial damage); Steele v. Helrnerich
& Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 738 F.2d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 1984) (using Article 466
and other authorities to hold that stabbing board was not an appurtenance of an
offshore drilling rig). See also Lovett, supra note 166, at 674-75 (discussing cases
noted above).
198. 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985).
199. Id. at 1178.
200. Id. This part and the rest of the Equibank court's analysis is discussed at




defining those items which the legislature meant to include within
the term electrical installation. '2 '
Following this analysis and the Equibank court's repeated
references to "the eyes of society, .... the societal viewpoint," "the
ordinary views of society," and finally "the societal expectation," 20
2
other courts in subsequent judicial decisions consistently came to
hold that "societal expectations.-"the views of the public on which
items are ordinarily regarded as part of a building" in the Equibank
court's terms-must be considered in determining whether an object
that fails to satisfy the substantial damage test articulated in Article
466's second paragraph can nevertheless fall into one of the expressly
enumerated categories in the article's first paragraph or the analogous
catch all "other installations" category in that paragraph, even though
such considerations are nowhere mentioned in the text of the
article.2"3 Further, courts and commentators, including the United
States Fifth Circuit, enshrined the essentially disjunctive
interpretation of Article 466 first articulated in Equibank and thus
consistently viewed the two paragraphs of Article 466 as imposing
"separate and distinct" tests which "should be applied independently
to determine whether a particular object is a component part.
Finally in 1999, however, another United States Fifth Circuit
panel in Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd v. General Star Indemnity Co.,205
reexamined this analytical approach and disregarded the apparent
jurisprudence constante that had transformed this article into a
springboard for the exercise of flexible and equitable judicial
201. Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1179 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 1179-80.
203. See e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 826 F.2d 361,
368 (5th Cir. 1987) ("However, as a matter of law, certain items are deemed to be
attached if they are so classified in the first paragraph of Article 466, regardless of the
actual degree of permanent attachment. One of the categories so enumerated is
'electrical installations.' While it might seem that a transformer would certainly be
an electrical installation, resort must be made to societal notions of what an electrical
installation is.") (emphasis added); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc, 527 So.
2d 1052, 1054-55 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (holding that consideration of "societal
expectations" dictated not only that light fixtures and electrical paraphernalia were
component parts of residence but that same analysis could be applied to carpeting;
thus "a reasonable person buying a residence expects finished flooring to be there
when he or she takes possession. The societal expectation is to have finished flooring,
such as carpeting"). These first two key decisions and others comprising Equibank's
progeny are discussed in detail in Lovett, supra note 166, at 683-90, and
Yiannopoulos, Zeus, supra note 185, at 1390-93.
204. Hyman, 643 So. 2d at 258. See also 2 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, § 142,
at 313, in La. Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991); Symeonides, supra note 192, at
688-89; Moll v. Brown & Root, Inc., 1999 WL 155948, *3-5 (E.D. La. 1999);
Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1997).
205. 179 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999).
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decision-making untethered to any positive expression of legislative
will,2"6 rejected the leading doctrinal justifications for the approach,2 °7
and applied a unitary and literal interpretation of Article 466, without
any consideration of "societal expectations,"2 to hold that certain
fire damaged, custom-built furniture that had been nailed to the floors
and walls of a hotel was not a component part of the hotel solely
because it could be removed without substantial damage to itself or
the building.2 9 The critical reaction to this decision in academic
circles was, to say the least, negative and intense.
2 10
Interestingly though, and in a way that is reminiscent of early
nineteenth century Louisiana courts' refusal to recognize either the
1808 Digest or the 1825 Civil Code as classic civil codes in the sense
of shutting off access to the ancient Spanish law of pre-cession
Louisiana," the academic criticism of the Prytania Park decision
has focused on the Fifth Circuit's failure to acknowledge a pre-
revision decision authored by Judge (and later Justice) Albert Tate,
Jr.,212 which endorsed consideration of "contemporary objective
206. In the words of the Fifth Circuit opinion authored by Judge Jacques L.
Wiener, Jr., "[w]e are aware from Equibank that the societal expectations canon
sprang-or, more accurately, was launched-full-grown from the forehead of an
expert witness who testified for the I.R.S. during the trial of that case." Id. at 180.
Further, the court noted:
The pedigree of the Professor's 'societal expectations' canon is murky
at best. First, there is no harbinger of such a supervening theory in
either the wording ofarticle 466 or the extensive 1978 official Revision
Comments accompanying that article. Neither are there clues
elsewhere in the Louisiana Civil Code to suggest such a penumbral
presence.
Id. at 181 n.34 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 181 n.2 (critiquing Professor Symeonides' views on Article 466).
208. Id. at 183 (concluding that "the only objectively reasonable approach to
interpretation is the one provided by article 466, under which, as we have
demonstrated, permanence of attachment turns solely on the extent of any collateral
damage that would occur on removal"). The court in Prytania Park also
characterized the disjunctive interpretation of Article 466 as having been based on
"an imaginative parsing of this article to visualize an otherwise invisible disjunctive
between the article's first and second paragraphs." Id. at 181.
209. Id. at 183; see also id. at 180 (noting essentially undisputed fact that only
"superficial-insubstantial-wall damage had occurred when the Furniture was
actually unbolted from the walls and removed").
210. See Yiannopoulos, Zeus, supra note 185, at 1394-97 (criticizing Prytania
Parkas "Paroxysmal Jurisprudence"); Carroll, supra note 192, (criticizing Prytania
Park throughout); Allums, supra note 192 (same).
211. Supra notes 67-71, 119-59 and accompanying text.
212. See Yiannopoulos, Zeus, supra note 185, at 1397 ("Apparently, neither
Judge Wiener nor his clerks carried a thorough search to determine 'the pedigree'
of societal expectations. Had they done so, they would have found the phrase
'societal expectations' was first coined by Judge Tate inLafleur v. Foret."); Carroll,
supra note 192, at 960 (making same point); Allums, supra note 192, at 1553-54
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standards"-in particular, "contemporary views as to conceptions of
components in light of current house construction
practices" 2 3-when determining whether items could be considered
"immovables by nature" under old Article 467. Curiously, this
criticism ignores or minimizes the possibility that the 1978 Revision
of Book II could easily be interpreted, especially in light of clear
signals in the Exposi des Motifs and the Revision Comments, as
having suppressed the old articles in this area and thus rendered old
jurisprudence based on these articles inconsequential 1 4  In any
event, the defenders of the continuing relevance of this pre-revision
jurisprudence have, whether wittingly or not, placed themselves in a
venerable Louisiana jurisprudential tradition commencing with
Justice Derbigny's decision in Cottin v. Cottin.2'
What is particularly striking in all this debate over Article 466 is
the overt and dueling concern once again for both certainty and
flexibility. In the conclusion of his critique of the Prytania Park
decision, Professor Yiannopoulos argues that "Articles 465 through
467 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as revised in 1978, are sufficiently
broad to provide certainty in the law and resolve most disputes in and
out of court."2 6  On one hand, legal certainty, for Professor
Yiannopoulos, seems to be a pragmatic and utilitarian goal that is
served by clear and precise legal rules. At the same time, however,
this "certainty in the law" with respect to "an ever-recurring problem
that involves significant consequences in many fields of law" will be
achieved, he advises, at least "at the fringes of the law," through
"interpretation, civilian methodology, doctrine, and notions
prevailing in society." '217 In other words, certainty will be achieved
in hard cases by granting judges plenty of discretion to make
determinations about the status of would-be component parts under
the first paragraph of Article 466 with "no need of proof, lay or
expert testimony, concerning the mode, scope, and purpose of
attachment of a movable to a building or other structure. ' 21T Under
both paragraphs of Article 466, he predicts, judges in such doubtful
cases will be influenced by "prevailing notions in society,' 219
something not mentioned in the positive law. Despite the questions
raised by Prytania Park and in spite of the admitted need for ample
(same).
213. LaFleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141, 148 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
214. Lovett, supra note 166, at 666-74.
215. 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817); see also supra notes 67-71 and accompanying
text.
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judicial discretion, Yiannopoulos concludes that we have not
witnessed the dawn of"an era of chaos and uncertainty.,
220
Curiously, judicial reactions to the Prytania Park decision have
been mixed. One Louisiana court was hesitant to declare its
allegiance to either the Equibank approach or the Prytania Park
approach.22' A little later, the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to
subtly endorse the disjunctive, societal expectations-based approach
to Article 466 founded in Equibank but did not completely close the
door on the more formalistic approach favored by the Fifth Circuit in
Prytania Park.2 2  And finally, in a third decision, one judge
explicitly complained that Article 466, as construed by Equibank and
now seemingly endorsed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, "lacks
predictability for lawyers and litigants."223 In short, it seems that
legal certainty has not yet been achieved by the legislature and courts
in this particular area of property law, leaving it to private parties to
try to reestablish certainty to the extent they find such certainty to be
desirable.224
111. CONCLUSION
As the controversy surrounding Article 466 demonstrates, judges
and scholars in Louisiana still have allegiances to two sometimes
seemingly inconsistent goals respecting legal certainty. On one hand,
judges in some cases seem devoted to a positivistic understanding of
certainty which requires plainly written code articles to be interpreted221
as creating clear, bright-line rules. On the other hand, despite the
220. Id. at 1399.
221. See In re Exxon Coker Fire, 108 F. Supp.2d 628, 636-40 (M.D. La. 2000)
(electing not to chose between competing analytical approaches and holding that,
regardless of approach used, elbow piping was component part of industrial coker
facility).
222. Showboat Star P'ship v. Slaughter, 789 So. 2d 554, 558-61 (2001). See
Lovett, supra note 166, at 707-09 (demonstrating ambivalence at heart of Louisiana
Supreme Court's opinion in Showboat Star).
223. Exxon Corp. v. Foster-Wheeler Corp., 805 So. 2d 432, 438 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2001) (Fitzsimmons, J. concurring); but see id. at 436-37 (majority opinion
following Equibank approach as "validated" by the Louisiana Supreme Court).
224. See Rose, supra note 2, at 602 (explaining how in some cases individuals
may actually prefer uncertainty because just as crystalline rules "seem to perform
the service of creating a context in which strangers can deal with each other in
confidence .... mud rules, too, attempt to recreate an underlying non-legal trading
community in which confidence is possible [, i.e., they] mimic a pattern of post hoc
readjustments that people would make if they were in an ongoing relationship with
each other ").
225. Prytania Park Hotel v. Gen. Star Indern Co., 179 F.3d 169, 180-83 (5th
Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J.); Exxon Corp. v. Foster-Wheeler Corp., 805 So. 2d 432,438
(La. App. 1st Cir. 2001) (Fitzsimmons, J. concurring).
1446 [Vol. 63
JOHN A. LOVETT
revision of the Civil Code, or perhaps because of the arguably
unequivocal nature of the revision process,226 others seem devoted to
promoting the continuity of older legal rules and reluctant to turn
their backs on the numerous accumulated judicial decisions that, with
the help of doctrinal writing, have created a rich jurisprudential gloss
on the Code.227 At the same time, by emphasizing the need for ex-
poste equitable adjustments, broad and flexible considerations of
societal attitudes and values, these same judges and scholars could be
said to be deliberately smudging "hard edged," "crystalline" rules
that the legislature established for the purpose of simplifying and
clarifying the law. In the end, perhaps this movement towards
flexibility and uncertainty simply represents the same oscillation
between crystals and mud-between certainty and flexibility-that
is endemic to any legal system. 22
8
We can now see that even as the problems confronted by the
proponents of legal certainty in the Louisiana civil law tradition have
evolved over time, there remains an underlying continuity to the
discourse about this all important principle. Although the Manifesto
demonstrates that legal certainty in the early nineteenth century
226. See Palmer, Death of a Code, supra note 66, at 224-27, 253-54 (arguing
that equivocal nature of revision of Civil Code and its incomplete repeal of prior
articles and jurisprudence has transformed the Code into a mere digest and will
spawn a crisis over sources), discussed in Lovett, supra note 166, at 639-45.
227. See, e.g., Showboat Star P'ship, 789 So. 2d at 558-59 n.4 (La. 2001),
(relying on pre-revision jurisprudence to interpret Article 466 of the Civil Code);
Yiannopoulos, Zeus, supra note 185, at 1399 ("The well settled jurisprudence may
be regarded as jurisprudence constante, indisputably a part of Louisiana property
law that all courts must respect"); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine
as Sources of Law in Louisiana and in France, in The Role of Judicial Decisions
in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions 69, 71-77 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974)
(discussing theoretical and practical advantages of recognizing heightened role of
jurisprudence as source of law in providing for more flexibility and responsiveness
to social change and in promoting continuity and stability of the law); Tate,
Techniques, supra note 1, at 746-48 (explaining reasons for judicial attachment to
prior precedents as source of law); Tate, Role of the Judge, supra note 161, at 33
("After all, the code is like an iceberg in the ocean of the [civil law] tradition. The
10 percent that has been legislated rests its weight on the hidden 90 percent.");
Lovett, supra note 166, at 631-38 (discussing pragmatic views of Tate,
Yiannopoulos and others about role of judicial precedent).
228. Rose, supra note 2, at 604:
If things matter to us, we try to place clear bounds around them when
we make up rules for our dealings with strangers so that we can invest
in the things or trade them. The overloading of clear systems,
however, may lead to forfeitures---dramatic losses that we can only see
post hoc, and whose post hoc avoidance makes us (as judges) muddy
the boundaries we have drawn. Then, at some point we may become
so stymied by muddiness that as rulemakers we will start over with
new boundaries, followed by new muddiness, and so on.
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seems to have been primarily, but not exclusively, associated with the
continued preservation of "ancient laws," '29 in the twenty-first
century, as the Article 466 controversy shows, in a world in which
legislative positivism would seem to be taken for granted, some
jurists and judges analyzing Louisiana's private law still display a
remarkable attachment to jurisprudence and laws that preceded our
most recent revisions of the Civil Code. 3 ' Similarly, although we
can now appreciate the extent to which early nineteenth century
Louisiana legal decision making was dominated by confident,
common law oriented judges like Justices Martin and Porter much
more than by positivistic thinking legislatures,23" ' today our
jurisprudence and doctrine still sometimes favors granting broad
discretionary power to judges to solve legal problems in key areas
even when our legislature seems to have given us sharply edged,
bright line rules.23
In short, it seems that the profound concern for "certainty"
expressed by proponents of the civil law in Louisiana as far back as
1806 is still with us. However, the civil law's "brooding anxiety
about certainty" '233 may be more important as a rhetorical construct
than as an actual organizing principle. In other words, although we
continue to pay homage to this concern about certainty, that concern
can have multiple and at times conflicting valences and can often be
subordinated to the competing values of flexibility and equity.
229. Supra notes 31-62 and accompanying text.
230. Supra notes 211-22 and accompanying text.
231. Supra notes 93-99, 129-58, and accompanying text.
232. Supra notes 198-224 and accompanying text.
233. Merryman, supra note 1, at 82.
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